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This chapter examines the facts and processes characterizing 
the dynamic macroeconomic adjustments in Turkey since the 
start of its reforms toward global integration. The study is 
organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on the analytics of 
macro adjustments of the two distinct (i.e., 1980-1988/1989 
and 1989-2000) phases of liberalization. Section 3 quantifies 
the macro adjustments via a set of decomposition exercises 
and traces the evolution of real output and sources of 
aggregate demand. Microlevel adjustments and related 
decomposition exercises, in turn, are investigated in Section 4 
for the manufacturing sector. The distributional effects of 
liberalization of commodity trade and finance are summarized 
in Section 5, and Section 6 gives a conclusion.
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1. Introduction
The integration of developing national economies into the 
evolving world financial system has been achieved by a series 
of policies aimed at liberalizing their financial sectors. The 
motive behind financial liberalization was to restore growth 
and stability by raising saving and improving economic 
efficiency. A major consequence, however, has been the 
exposure of these economies to speculative short‐term capital 
movements (hot money) that increased financial instability and 
resulted in a series of financial crises in these countries. 
Furthermore, contrary to expectations, the post‐liberalization 
period was marked by the divergence of domestic savings 
away from fixed capital investments toward speculative 
financial instruments. These instruments often had erratic and 
volatile yields. As a result, national economies with weak 
financial structures and shallow markets suffered from an 
increased volatility of output growth, shortsightedness of 
entrepreneurial decisions, and financial crises with severe 
economic and social consequences.
It is the purpose of this chapter to identify and study the main 
stylized facts and processes characterizing the dynamic 
macroeconomic adjustments in Turkey since the inception of 
its reforms toward global integration. Under the neoliberal 
regime, Turkey in the post 1980s has undergone persistent 
difficulties, wide fluctuations in national income, and 
conflicting policy adjustments.1 At the turn of the century, the 
most striking aspects of the current Turkish political economy 
are the persistence of price inflation in a crisis‐prone 
economic structure, stubborn and rapidly expanding fiscal 
deficits; a marginalized labor force, the dramatic deterioration 
in the economic conditions of the poor, and the severe erosion 
of moral values along with increased public corruption.2
We plan this study as follows: the analytics of macro 
adjustments of the two distinct (i.e., 1980–1988/1989 and 
1989–2000) phases of liberalization is the theme of section 2. 
We address the modes of  (p.418) accumulation and the 
resolution of macro equilibria under both periods separately, 
and highlight the ascendancy of finance over industrial 
development. We also investigate the nature and evolution of 
the flows of short‐term foreign capital. In particular, we 
document the detrimental consequences of hot money flows in 
inducing instability at the onset of the 2000–2001 financial 
crisis. Section 3 quantifies the macro adjustments via a set of 
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decomposition exercises and traces the evolution of real 
output and sources of aggregate demand. The deterioration of 
fiscal balances forms the thematic background of this section. 
Microlevel adjustments and related decomposition exercises, 
in turn, are investigated in section 4 for the manufacturing 
sector. Here we address two separate, yet related, issues: (1) 
the effect of external liberalization on oligopolistic 
concentration and price‐cost margins; and (2) the patterns of 
investment behavior under external liberalization. We 
summarize the distributional effects of liberalization of 
commodity trade and finance in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Phases of Macroeconomic Adjustment in Turkey
The post‐1980 adjustment path started with an orthodox 
stabilization policy that also incorporated the first structural 
steps toward a market‐based mode of regulation. The shock 
treatment of 1980, facilitated by the military coup of 
September and generously supported by international donors, 
was, to a large degree, successful in terms of its own policy 
goals. The rate of inflation that had almost reached three digit 
figures in 1980 was reduced to an average of 33.2 percent in 
the following two years. The recession was a brief and 
relatively mild one (the GDP fell by 2.3 percent in 1980). The 
liberalization of domestic markets eliminated the painful 
shortages in basic commodities, and the major realignment in 
relative prices took place relatively smoothly. However, the 
whole operation was, to a large extent, dependent on the 
drastic regression of labor incomes. This was realized through 
the suppressive control of the relations of distribution by the 
military regime. The first phase of reforms was followed by a 
gradual move to trade liberalization in 1984 (which culminated 
in a Customs Union with the EU eleven years later) and the 
liberalization of the capital account in 1989.
Particularly during the early phases of its inception, the 
Turkish adjustment program was hailed as a “model” by the 
orthodox international community, and was supported by 
generous structural adjustment loans, debt relief, and 
technical aid. Currently, the Turkish economy can be said to be 
operating under conditions of a truly “open economy”—a 
macroeconomic environment where both the current and 
capital accounts are completely liberalized. In this setting, 
many of the instruments of macro and fiscal control have been 
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transformed, and the constraints of macro equilibrium have 
undergone major structural changes.
We provide a general overview of the recent macroeconomic 
history of Turkey in table 14.1. We identify the 1972–1979 
period as the deepening of the industrialization strategy based 
on import substitution (ISI). This period, often called the 
second phase of import substitution, was part of the evolution 
of the inward‐looking, domestic demand–led industrialization 
that dated back to the 1950s. The late 1970s witnessed a 
vigorous public investment program aimed at expanding 
domestic production capacity in heavy manufacturing, capital 
goods (such as machinery), petrochemicals, and basic 
intermediates. The foreign trade regime was heavily protected 
via quantitative restrictions along with a fixed exchange rate 
regime that, on average, was overvalued in purchasing parity 
terms. The state was both an investor and a producer, with 
state economic enterprises (SEEs) serving as the major tools 
for fostering industrialization targets.
During the import‐substitution phase, the underlying political 
economy of the industrialization strategy was a grand, yet 
precarious, alliance between the bureaucratic elites, industrial 
capitalists, industrial workers, and peasantry (Boratav, Keyder, 
and Pamuk 1984). Accordingly, private industrial profits were 
fed from three sources. First, the protectionist trade regime 
(often implemented through strong non‐tariff barriers) enabled 
industrialists to capture oligopolistic profits and rents from a 
readily available and protected domestic market. Second, the 
existence of a public enterprise system that produced cheap 
intermediates through artificially low administered prices 
enabled private industrial enterprises (and the rural economy) 
to minimize material input costs. Third, a repressed financial 
system (supported by undervalued foreign currencies) enabled 
cheap financing for fixed capital investments in 
manufacturing. Industrialists, in turn, “accepted” a general 
rise in manufacturing wages together with an agricultural 
support program  (p.419)
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1.8 0.5 0.6 0.8 7.8 0.1 –0.7 1.3 8.4 –4.6 4.1 –4.9
Manufac
turing
9.7 –0.2 7.9 8.6 1.6 6.0 –7.6 10.2 1.2 –5.7 5.9 –8.5
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Importse 11.7 11.2 14.0 15.9 15.8 14.6 17.8 23.2 22.5 21.7 27.2 27.0








1.4 14.5 27.1 37.8 44.8 35.1 49.6 45.6 50.9 55.7 58.3 75.4
Sources: SPO Main Economic Indicators; Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade and Treasury Main Economic Indicators; SIS 
Manufacturing Industry Surveys.
a. 1975–76 only.
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b. Annual average of Compounded Interest Rate on Government Debt Instruments deflated by the whole sale price index.
c. Wage earnings of workers engaged in production. Private manufacturing labor data cover enterprises employing 10+ workers.
d. Refer to unit wage costs in ($) obtained from production workers in private manufacturing.
e. Including luggage trade after 1996.
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 (p.420)  (p.421) that induced the domestic terms of trade in 
favor of agriculture.
Import substitution reached its limits in 1976 when keeping up 
the investment drive and financing the consequent current 
deficits became increasingly difficult. The foreign exchange 
crisis of 1977–1980, accompanied by civil unrest and political 
instability, ended with an orthodox stabilization package 
(1980) and a right‐wing military regime (1980–1983).
2.1. Major Turning Points and the Early Phase, 1981–1988/1989
Macroeconomic developments in the post‐1980 period may be 
divided into two phases: 1981–1988/1989 and 1990–2000. The 
main characteristics of the first phase were export promotion 
with strong subsidies and gradually phased import 
liberalization, together with a managed floating exchange rate 
and regulated capital movements. The gradual but significant 
depreciation of the Turkish lira (TL) was one of the pillars of 
the new policy orientation. Severe depression of wage incomes 
and declining agricultural support measures continued during 
the years following the military regime. There was also a 
decisive shift toward a supply‐side orientation in fiscal 
policies.3
Domestic financial liberalization was an additional component 
of the 1980s reforms. The early phase of financial 
liberalization turned out to be a painful process. The speedy 
lifting of controls on deposit interest rates and on credit 
allocation in mid‐1980 led to the financial scandal of 1982. The 
crisis occurred when numerous money brokers (called 
“bankers”) who had flourished by offering very high real 
interest rates to savers via Ponzi financing schemes went 
under along with a number of smaller banks. Thereafter, the 
policy pendulum moved between reregulation and 
deregulation up till the late 1980s. But the trend, although 
gradual, was definitely toward the establishment of a 
liberalized financial system.
In retrospect, the mode and pace of financial reforms during 
the 1980s progressed in leaps and bounds, mostly following 
pragmatic solutions to emerging problems. The foreign 
exchange regime was liberalized early in 1984. Banks were 
allowed to accept foreign currency deposits from residents 
and to engage in specified external transactions. An interbank 
money market for short‐term borrowing facilities became 
operational in 1986. In the following year, the Central Bank 
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diversified its monetary instruments by starting open market 
operations. The Capital Market Board, a supervisory and 
regulatory agency over the capital market, was established, 
which initiated the reopening of the Istanbul Stock Exchange.
During 1983–1987, export revenues increased at an annual 
rate of 10.8 percent, and the gross domestic product rose at 
an annual rate of 6.5 percent. These years were also 
characterized by the continued erosion of wage incomes—a 
process that had started early in the decade under the 1980 
stabilization package and with the hostile measures against 
organized labor by the military regime.4 The suppression of 
wages was instrumental both in lowering production costs and 
in squeezing domestic absorption. The share of wage labor in 
manufacturing value‐added declined from an average of 35.6 
percent in 1977–1980 to 15.4 percent in 1988 (see table 14.1), 
and average markup rates (gross profit margins as a ratio of 
current costs) in private manufacturing increased from 31 to 
38 percent (Metin, Voyvoda, and Yeldan 2001a).
The severe deterioration of public sector balances in the late 
1970s was brought under relative control during the 1980s. 
Compared with the crisis years of 1977–1980, the public 
sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) declined by more than 2 
percentage points to 4.7 percent of the gross domestic product 
(GDP). Thanks to improved public and external accounts 
during the accelerated growth phase of 1983–1987, the gap 
between domestic savings and investment rates, which were 
recorded at 19.5 and 20.7 percent respectively, remained at a 
manageable magnitude (see table 14.1).
There were, however, adverse changes with respect to the 
composition of total fixed investments in tradable sectors. In 
fact, as gross fixed investments of the private sector increased 
by 14.1 percent during 1983–1987, only a small portion of this 
amount was directed toward manufacturing. The rate of 
growth of private manufacturing investments was on the order 
of half of this figure, at a rate of only 7.7 percent per annum, 
and could not reach its pre‐1980 levels in real terms until the 
end of 1989. As data in table 14.1 attest, much of the 
expansion in private investments originated from housing 
investments that expanded by an annual average of 24.5 
percent during 1983–1987.
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This resulted in a significant anomaly as far as the official 
stance toward industrialization was concerned: in a period 
where outward orientation was supposedly  (p.422) directed 
toward increasing manufacturing exports through significant 
price and subsidy incentives, the distribution of investments 
revealed a declining trend for the sector. The implications of 
this non‐conformity between the stated foreign trade 
objectives toward manufacturing exports and the realized 
patterns of accumulation away from manufacturing 
constituted one of the main structural deficiencies of the 
growth pattern of the period. The impressive export boom of 
the 1980s was, thereby, essentially predicated on productive 
capacities established during the preceding decade. Thus, 
capacity constraints and limited technological upgrading 
contributed to the overall deceleration in the export growth of 
manufactures (by 4.4 percent) during 1989–2000.
The export‐led growth path, which was dependent on wage 
suppression, the depreciation of the domestic currency, and 
extremely generous export subsidies, reached its economic 
and political limits by 1988. Regressive distributional policies 
were crucial to the internal logic of the model; but it was 
becoming more and more difficult to sustain them within the 
political and social context prevailing at the end of 1988. Two 
consecutive years of negative per capita growth and a new 
wave of populist pressures leading to distributional shocks 
immediately before the 1989 elections were evidence that the 
policy model of 1980–1988 had exhausted itself. The way out 
of the impasse (by accident or design) turned out to be the 
liberalization of the capital account in August 1989. The full 
convertibility of the Turkish lira was realized at the beginning 
of 1990.
2.2. Capital Account Liberalization and Its Consequences
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The 1989 benchmark was, indeed, the second turning point in 
the economic policies of the post‐1980 period in terms of both 
its distributional implications and macroeconomic 
consequences. The fiscal and financial dimensions of the shift 
toward populism and capital account liberalization will be 
reviewed further below. The macroeconomic consequences 
will be analyzed with regard to four aspects. First, optimistic 
expectations about financial deepening within the domestic 
financial markets did not materialize. Second, capital account 
liberalization made the economy vulnerable to newly emerging 
financial cycles. Third, substantial leakages from net inflows—
that is, through capital outflows and reserve accumulation—
transmuted the conventional linkages between growth, 
current account balance, and capital flows. And, finally, 
arbitrage‐seeking (“hot money”) inflows and outflows began to 
constitute a rising share of capital movements and contributed 
to rising external and domestic instability.5
2.2.1. Increased Fragility in the Domestic Financial Markets
One can easily trace the drastic effects of the unregulated 
opening of domestic financial markets and consequent 
financial deepening in the Turkish economy. Contrary to 
expectations, the public sector's share in financial markets 
remained high. The financing behavior of corporations did not 
show significant change, and credit financing from the 
banking sector and interfirm borrowing continued. 
Furthermore, the share of private sector securities in total 
financial assets fell. Thus, the observed upward trend of the 
proportion of securities to GNP originated from the new issues 
of public sector debt, particularly treasury bills. The 
commercial banking system was the major customer of such 
securities. The banks, in turn, were operational in marketing 
the T‐bills to private households via repo operations. The repo–
reverse repo trading volume, which stood at around US$5 
billion in 1997, accelerated rapidly to $221 billion in 2000, or 
110 percent of the GNP (see table 14.2). Securitized deficit 
financing through T‐bills and other debt instruments led to an 
overall increase in real interest rates, including deposit rates. 
Hence, time deposits/GNP ratios tend to rise after 1996. In 
fact, with the implementation of positive interest rates and the 
new possibility of foreign exchange accounts for private 
households, financial deepening has meant increased foreign 
exchange deposits with substantial currency substitution. 
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Thus, it can be stated that the public sector securities and 
foreign exchange deposits were the pioneering symbols of 
financial deepening in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s.
As Akyuz (1990) and Balkan and Yeldan (2002) attest based on 
these observations, the Turkish experience did not conform to 
the McKinnon‐Shaw hypothesis of financial deepening with a 
shift of portfolio selection from “unproductive” assets to those 
favoring fixed capital formation. Indeed, throughout the 
course of these events, Turkish banks became  (p.423)
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Table 14.2 Financial Deepening in Turkey: Financial Assets and Monetary Indicators (% of GNP)












3.0 3.9 3.2 1.8 6.8 7.5 4.8 4.4 8.3 8.0 2.5 27.3 32.3
Treasur
y Bills
4.0 3.3 2.1 5.4 8.7 9.0 16.7 15.4 24.8 14.9 26.9 11.3 5.2
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Sector
0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 3.8 2.1 2.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 4.6
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1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Trading 
Volumea
Sources: Central Bank, Quarterly Bulletins; SPO, Main Economic Indicators.
a. Millions US$.
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 (p.424) detached from their conventional functions, and started 
to act as institutional rentiers. They were able to make huge 
arbitrage gains when conditions were appropriate (see table 14.3), 
but became extremely vulnerable to exchange rate risks and to 
sudden changes in the inflation rate. In their new functions, they 
gradually emerged as the dominant faction within business groups, 
especially in terms of influencing and manipulating economic 
policies.
Some parameters of this process are reported in table 14.3. 
The net return on speculative arbitrage (“hot money”) is given 
in column 1. This return is calculated as the rate of difference 
between the highest (nominal) interest rate offered in the 
domestic economy and the rate of (nominal) appreciation of 
the foreign currencies. It yields the net return to a foreign 
portfolio investment, which switches into Turkish lira, 
captures the interest income offered in the domestic economy, 
and switches back to the foreign currency at the end‐of‐period 
exchange rate. The difference between interest earned and the 
loss due to currency depreciation is the net earning 
appropriated by the investor.
The gross inflows and outflows of external credit to and from 
the banking system are tabulated under columns 2 and 3 of 
table 14.3, and the net flows of hot money injected into the 
domestic financial
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Table 14.3 Arbitrage Returns, Gross ExternalCredits to Banks and Hot Money Inflows (Mn.$)
Banking Sector Foreign Credits




1991 –0.038 43,186 42,523 –392
1992 0.154 64,767 62,363 2,439
1993 0.045 122,053 118,271 4,478
1994 –0.315 75,439 82,040 –5,913
1995 0.197 76,427 75,626 2,341
1996 0.329 8,824 8,055 2,198
1997 0.278 19,110 18,386 1,166
1998 0.254 19,288 19,225 2,267
1999 0.298 122,673 120,603 2,907
2000 0.133 209,432 204,691 4,863
Sources: Central Bank Balance of Payments Statistics; SPO Main Economic Indicators.
a. [(1 + R)/(1 + E)−1]; R: The highest rate of return offered in the domestic market; E: TL Rate of change of the exchange rate.
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system are listed under column 4. All of these flows are highly 
sensitive to whether or not the domestic rate of return is positive; 
the net flows are observed to be of the expected sign. Net flows 
fluctuated widely, especially between 1993–1995 and 1998–2000. 
The gross inflows of the banking sector's external credit grew 
rapidly from $50 billion in 1991 to $120 billion in 1995. After a 
brief deceleration during 1996 and 1998, they again climbed to 
$108.6 billion in 1999. Under the disinflation program, the gross 
inflows and outflows of the banking sector foreign credit were $209 
and $204 billion, respectively. This magnitude was in excess of the 
aggregate GNP in 2000!
A crucial factor behind all these developments was the 
collapse of public disposable income (which declined by 39 
percent in real terms during the 1990s) owing to the 
emergence of negative public savings from 1992 onwards (see 
table 14.4, below). This was, essentially, the outcome of 
borrowing from domestic banks at high interest rates (see 
table 14.1) so that a rising portion of tax revenues was 
allocated to interest payments: the ratio of interest payments 
to tax revenues rose almost without interruption from 28 
percent in 1992 to 77 percent in 2000. The magnitudes 
involved, more or less, made it inevitable that the financial 
system was directly shaped by the needs and methods of 
financing the public sector. Table 14.2 above documents this 
episode. The new issues of securities by the state increased 
from 6.9 percent of the GNP in 1988 to 38.7 percent in 1999. 
In contrast, issues by the private sector hovered around 1 
percent of the GNP before jumping to 4.6 percent in 2000. 
Total banking credits as a percentage of GNP, however, 
actually declined over the initial phase of capital account 
deregulation and would reach the pre‐liberalization share only 
seven years later, in 1996.
High interest rates offered by government bonds and treasury 
bills set the course for the dominance of finance over the real 
economy. As a result, the economy is trapped in a vicious 
circle: commitment to high interest rates and cheap foreign 
currency (an overvalued Turkish lira) against the threat of 
capital flight generates a floor below which real interest rates 
cannot decline. When adverse developments in the current 
account balance tend to become destabilizing, the only 
mechanism left to prevent the specter of a major devaluation 
and currency substitution and/or capital flight is further 
upward adjustment in the domestic interest rates. (p.425)
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Table 14.4 Public Sector Balances (Real 1987 Prices, Billions TL)1




10,313.8 11,818.9 13,855.2 13,965.6 15,145.1 17,452.2 15,597.0 15,830.0 17,065.0 20,099.2 22,235.4 22,458.0
Direct 3,983.1 5,120.1 5,879.7 6,013.8 6,359.6 7,115.8 6,820.7 6,061.9 6,195.1 7,380.5 9,668.1 9,346.9






















9,866.1 10,587.0 12,095.6 10,196.4 9,966.8 9,498.1 8,083.3 8,779.7 7,755.4 11,912.6 9,919.9 7,351.5
Public 
Savings




–6,147.9 –5,938.0 –7,762.3 –6,516.7 –5,926.4 –7,224.9 –3,071.7 –3,553.3 –5,101.9 –6,570.7 –7,115.6 –6,889.0
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PSBR 4.8 5.3 7.4 10.2 10.6 12.1 7.9 5.2 8.8 7.6 9.2 15.1
Budget 
Balance










2.1 0.8 0.9 0.4 1.6 1.4 –1.7 –1.1 –0.9 –1.5 –2.0 0.6
Stock of 
GDI's 3




3.8 3.6 3.5 3.8 3.7 5.8 7.7 7.5 10.2 7.7 11.7 13.7
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1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 19992
Domesti
c Debt
2.4 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.8 4.6 6.0 6.2 9.0 6.7 10.6 12.6
Foreign 
Debt










41.7 48.5 40.7 41.7 58.6 48.9 53.1 52.4 57.8 52.4 49.5 49.3
Sources: SPO Main Economic Indicators; Undersecreteriat of Treasury, Treasury Statistics, 1980–1999.
1. Deflated by the wholesale price index.
2. Provisional.
3. Government debt instruments (government bonds + treasury bills). Exclusive of Central Bank advances and consolidated debts.
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 (p.426) 2.2.2. The Emergence of a New Cycle and Financial 
Crises
2.2.2.1. The Financial Cycle Dominates the Growth Process.
This unstable environment is closely linked with the 
emergence of a new financial cycle that, ultimately, dominates 
the growth process. Findings presented in table 14.5 depict 
one similarity and two differences between growth patterns of 
the 1980s and the 1990s.6 On the one hand, the quantitative 
relationship between growth and current deficits remains 
stable and moderate during the two decades. This finding 
suggests that the external gap (in terms of the relative 
magnitude of foreign exchange requirements of given rates of 
economic growth) was practically unchanged between the two 
periods.7
On the other hand, an important difference is observed 
between the two decades when looking at the linkages 
between non‐resident capital flows (i.e., NKF(nr), following the 
notation of table 14.5), current deficits, and growth. During 
the 1980s, the linkages between these variables appear to be 
in the direction of growth → current deficits → capital inflows. 
In other words, a given growth rate generates current deficits 
that have to be covered by a somewhat larger margin of 
capital inflows from non‐residents. The 1990s appear to have 
transformed the direction of the
Table 14.5 Net Capital Flows by Non‐residents 













1990 3.0 1.7 9.4
1991 0.2 –0.2 0.4
1992 4.3 0.6 6.4
1993 7.1 3.5 8.1
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Bust: 1994 –4.8 –2.0 –6.1
1995 3.5 1.4 8.0
1996 5.4 1.3 7.1




Bust: 1998 1.8 –0.9 3.9
1999 4.6 0.7 –6.1
2000 6.5 4.9 6.1
Source: IMF, Balance of PaymentsStatistics and official 
Turkish data.
*Period averages are logarithmic growth rates.
above linkage into capital inflows → growth → current deficits. 
Inflows from non‐residents gradually become autonomous 
(incorporating a rising component of “hot money”)8 and, depending 
on the degree of sterilization, impact domestic demand and uplift 
the growth rate and, ultimately, generate a higher level of current 
deficits. When inflows decline, the process is reversed by depleting 
reserves, monetary contraction, declining domestic demand, and an 
improved current balance. Hence, one of the crucial consequences 
of capital account liberalization turns out to be an increased degree 
of dependence of the growth path on autonomous capital 
movements.
There is, moreover, another striking difference between the 
growth paths of the two periods. During the 1990s, changes in 
the level and direction of capital movements generated a 
financial cycle of boom‐bust‐recovery that, in turn, resulted in 
the rising volatility of the growth rate. Growth during the 
1980s—being, to a large degree, independent of autonomous 
capital flows—was essentially an export‐led process supported, 
at first, by the post‐crisis recovery of the early 1980s and, 
then, by the Özal government's expansionary policy stance 
(1984–1987). Although the last stage of this episode was 
stagnation and exhaustion, it was radically different from the 
bust phase of the financial cycles of the following decade. 
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Indeed, the post‐1990 years exhibit four downturns (1991, 
1994, 1998–1999, and 2001), the latter three of which also 
incorporate financial crises of varying intensity, and four 
booms (1990, 1992–1993, 1995–1997, and 2000). It is also 
striking that as we move into the twenty‐first century, the 
duration of the mini business cycles seems to have shortened 
even further. In fact, the growth rate was negative in ten of 
the sixteen quarters from January 1998 up till the end of 2001.
2.2.2.2. An Anatomy of Financial Crises, Turkish Style.
A brief overview of the bust phases of these cycles that 
incorporated serious banking and/or currency crises, that is, 
1994, 1998–1999, and 2001, will be helpful in this context. 
Tables 14.5 and 14.6 show that it is not possible to diagnose 
the underlying cause of these financial disturbances without 
observing the volatility of capital flows. 1994 appears to 
exhibit the most violent impact in this respect: net flows by 
non‐residents were reversed into outflows reaching 4.8 
percent of GNP. The absolute magnitude of the reversal 
represented by the difference in inflows between the two 
years, that is, 1994 minus 1993 figures  (p.427)
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Table 14.6 Net Capital Flows by Non‐Residents (NKF(nr)), Recorded Net Capital Flows by Residents (NKF(r)), 
Errors and Omissions (EO), Current Account Balance (CA) and Reserve Movements (DR)










24,536 –10,333 –9,782 –2,932 –1,489 –0.421 –0.12 –0.061 –0.399
Bust 1994 –6,259 2,409 2,631 1,766 –547 * * * *
1994–1993 –19,090 6,277 9,064 3,988 –239 * * * *
Expansion 
1995–97
27,173 –4,832 –7,454 –2,021 –12,866 –0.178 –0.074 –0.473 –0.274
Bust 1998 3,677 –3,453 1,984 –1,991 –217 –0.939 –0.541 –0.059 0.54
1998–1997 –7,623 –742 4,663 603 3,099 * * * *
Boom 2000 
(I‐X)




–27,595 1,460 7,891 –665 18,909 * * *
1980–1989 15,529 –3,471 –10,408 2,910 –4,560 –0.224 0.187 –0.294 –0.670




–0.228 –0.111 –0.118 –0.543
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–0.241 –0.060 –0.268 –0.431
Note: NKF(nr) + NKF(r) + EO + DR + CA = 0.
* Ratios are meaningless when NKF (nr) is negative.
** The cumulative values for November 2000 to September 2001–the cumulative values for January to October in 2001.
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for NKF(nr), equaled –$19.1 billion. Somewhat surprisingly, 
resident agents (essentially banks) acted in countercyclical fashion 
by eliminating their assets abroad and allocating funds to cover 
their losses in Turkey.9 The net reversal of both non‐resident and 
resident flows in 1994 compared with the 1993 figure was –$12.8 
billion (i.e., 9.7 percent of GNP). The magnitude of the reversal 
forced the government into two consecutive devaluations of the 
Turkish lira and pushed the economy into a severe (i.e., –6.1 and –
5.5 percent in terms of GNP and GDP, respectively) recession.
The 1998 bust also witnessed comparable reversals in capital 
movements. The net reversal of resident and non‐resident 
flows between 1998 and 1997 reached up to –$8 billion, or 3.9 
percent of the GNP. Although a currency crisis was averted, 
the outcome was the de facto bankruptcy of eight banks taken 
over formally by the so‐called Savings Deposits Insurance 
Fund, or SDIS (in effect, by the treasury).10 The burden on the 
exchequer due to the liabilities of these banks as of July 2001 
was estimated to be around $14 billion or 9.3 percent of the 
GNP. The effect of these events on the productive sectors 
became visible from the last quarter of 1998, and the economy 
went into a severe recession that continued during 1999 when 
the GNP declined by 6.1 percent in real terms.
The year 2000 witnessed an exchange rate–based disinflation 
and stabilization program, designed, engineered, and 
monitored by the IMF. Starting from inflation rates of 68.8 and 
62.9 percent at the end of 1999 in terms of CPI and WPI 
respectively, the program targeted 25 percent and 20 percent 
inflation rates for the two indices at the end of 2000. 
Furthermore, it programmed a 20 percent depreciation of the 
nominal Turkish lira against the basket of 1US$ + 0.77 euro. 
Upper limits for the net domestic assets of the Central Bank 
(CB) were set, and the monetary base was to be totally 
dependent on the purchases of foreign exchange by the CB. 
Together with lower limits for net international reserves and 
upper limits for the PSBR as performance criteria and with the 
exclusion of sterilization as a policy option, the program can 
be interpreted as a mild currency board (Yeldan 2001b).
The program appeared to be successful in the first ten months 
of its implementation. Monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate 
targets were fully met and the IMF praised the Turkish 
authorities on the successful implementation of the program. 
Although domestic  (p.428)
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less than the 
targeted rates 
of change of 
price indices 
and of nominal 
exchange 
rates. Between the last weeks of 1999 and 2000, the exchange rate 
basket rose by 20.3 percent, but rates of change in WPI and CPI 
indices were 32.7 and 39.0 percent, respectively. Disregarding the 
price movements of trade partners, these figures correspond to the 
real appreciation of the Turkish lira by 10.4 and 15.6 percent in 
terms of the two price indices, respectively.
The appreciation of the domestic currency was further boosted 
by an explosive growth in net capital flows by non‐residents 
that reached $15.5 billion by the first ten months of 2000. This 
was reflected in the Central Bank's balance sheet: net external 
assets increased by 53 percent, and the monetary base by 46 
percent between February and mid‐November of 2000. In 
contrast, the wholesale price index rose by (roughly) 22 
percent during the same period. Given the “initial success” of 
the program, risk margins narrowed and real interest rates on 
government debt instruments (GDIs) rapidly fell from an 
average of 33 percent in 1999 to practically zero during 2000. 
A very strong upturn in domestic absorption accompanied by 
the appreciation of the Turkish lira together with the impact of 
the Customs Union with EU were the major reasons behind 
the rapid expansion of the current account deficit to $9.5 
billion by the end of 2000 (see table 14.1). This outcome was 
solely due to the deterioration of the trade balance.11 By 
November, IMF officials started to express their concerns 
about the sustainability of the current deficit12 and external 
investors appeared to share the same concern by liquidating 
their assets in Turkish lira, as international bankers started to 
call in their short‐term loans to Turkish banks.13
Although real interest rates on government borrowing had 
declined to practically zero, short‐term inflows continued 
throughout most of 2000, because strict commitment to 
Figure 14.1  Short Term Foreign/Debt/CB 
Reserves (%)
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nominal exchange rate targets kept generating positive 
arbitrage rate expectations for banks, which, ex post, 
averaged 13 percent for the whole year.14 Even though 
government bonds with maturities of 12–18 months purchased 
on lower rates were to generate serious problems for banks in 
2001 (after the collapse of the exchange rate and when 
inflation was, once again rising), most banks continued to 
borrow short‐term loans abroad during the year.
The ratio of short‐term debt to international reserves that had 
stood at 101 percent at the inception of the program jumped 
to 152 percent in December 2000. Figure 14.1 portrays the 
trajectory of the short‐term debt/Central Bank Reserves ratio 
in Turkey and compares it with the data observed in various 
East Asian economies at the onset of their crises in July 1997. 
In retrospect, considering the East Asian experiences, Turkey 
exhibited serious deterioration in  (p.429)















did so at the 
cost of the 
increased fragility of the banking system and the external 
vulnerability of the Turkish economy, as validated by the twin crises 
of November 2000 and February 2001.
A sudden outflow, as non‐residents liquidated their treasury 
bills and equity assets, started a run against the Turkish lira in 
November. Additional foreign exchange demand resulted in 
the erosion of the Central Bank reserves by nearly $7 billion, 
whose net external assets declined by 52 percent in two weeks 
after mid‐November. The macroeconomic impact was chaotic. 
As can be seen from figure 14.2, the Central Bank had played 
the role assigned to it under the program (i.e., the role of a de 
Figure 14.2  Monetary Base, Net 
Domestic Assets, Net Foreign Assets, and 
Net Open Market Operations (January 7, 
2000–December 1, 2000, End‐of‐Week 
Observations)
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facto currency board) successfully until November when the 
first sign of the crisis struck. The monetary base reflected the 
changes in net foreign assets, while net domestic assets were 
kept within targeted limits. With the abrupt fall in its net 
external assets, the Central Bank initially violated the IMF ban 
on open market operations, and managed to provide additional 
Turkish lira liquidity to banks. This maneuver, however, did not 
prevent the monetary base from contracting by 17 percent 
during the rest of the month, as most of the additional liquidity 
came back to the Central Bank as foreign exchange demand. 
Ultimately, the Central Bank reverted back to the non‐
sterilization rule, and the ongoing liquidity squeeze was 
aggravated as overnight interest rates climbed to exorbitant 
levels.
Short‐term policies during the three months between the 
November and February crises were essentially aimed at 
preserving the exchange rate anchor at all costs. The reserve 
level continued to be low till the end of the year and 
contributed to a severe liquidity squeeze in the banking sector, 
high interest rates, and contractionary pressures on the 
economy. An agreement with the IMF late in December 
included a financial package of $10.5 billion. This funding kept 
the essential elements of the preceding program intact and 
replenished reserves early in January 2001.15 Foreign 
exchange markets were temporarily stabilized, albeit at 
interest rates significantly above the pre‐crisis levels.
Suppressing foreign exchange demand via exorbitant interest 
rates was clearly destabilizing. A political skirmish between 
the president and the prime minister was followed by a second 
attack on the Turkish lira in late February 2001. As interest 
rates rose to three‐digit figures, the Central Bank had to sell 
$5.2 billion within two days. This amount roughly equaled the 
non‐residents’ net liquidation of Turkish lira securities  (p.
430) (–$3.8 billion) and the amortization of short‐term bank 
loans (–$1.3 billion). The 2000 program officially came to an 
end as the free floating of the currency was announced on 
February 22. By mid‐May, a more conventional standby 
agreement with the IMF was finalized. The new program was 
structured around a long list of so‐called structural reforms, 
which (with the exception of those related to the banking 
system) had no immediate or even medium‐term relevance for 
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stabilization. It also included demand management via fiscal 
and monetary stringency, but with no targets for the exchange 
rate.
The impact of capital movements on the 2000–2001 cycle can 
be observed by the findings in tables 14.6 and 14.7 that, using 
monthly data, compare the boom phase (January to October 
2000) with the bust phase (November 2000 to September 
2001) of the cycle. Table 14.6 (row 8) shows the magnitudes 
involved as capital flows were reversed during the eleven 
months from November onward: the aggregate shock owing to 
the reversal in non‐resident capital flows in 2000–2001 (i.e., –
$27.6 billion) is significantly greater than those observed 
during the earlier crises in 1994 and 1998–1999. The 
breakdown of capital flows into non‐resident and resident 
flows in table 14.7 confirms that the drift into financial crisis 
was predominantly the result of capital outflows originating 
from non‐residents. Outflows from portfolio investments 
played the most crucial role, followed by the amortization of 
short‐term bank loans. Residents,
Table 14.7 Capital Movements Before and 
During the 2000/2001 Crisis (Mn.$)
2000 (I) to 2000 
(X)







Long‐term flows 3,201 190
Short‐term flows 4,600 –6,424
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2000 (I) to 2000 
(X)





D. Current balance –7,598 293
Sources: IMF, Balance of PaymentsStatistics and official 
Turkish data.
Note: A + B + C + D = 0
a. “–” signifies increase and vice versa.
particularly in terms of their recorded capital movements, once 
again acted countercyclically and their net outflows, including the 
unrecorded (i.e., EO) items, declined by $800 million. Even if this 
factor is included, the magnitude of the reversal between the first 
ten months of 2000 and the following eight months of all 
cumulative capital flows—NKF(nr), NKF(r), and EO—is an 
astounding–$27.6 billion!
Dramatic macroeconomic implications follow. The high tempo 
of inflows by non‐residents during the first ten months of 2000 
generated a boom with unstable characteristics. As external 
agents perceived the expansion as unsustainable, capital flows 
were reversed. The magnitude and suddenness of the reversal 
determined the depth of the financial crisis and its impact on 
the growth rate. Hence, in 2001 the economy moved into a 
depression (–9.4 percent in GNP) that was much more serious 
than those observed in the preceding crises. The contraction 
was accompanied by massive layoffs, rising inflation, 
increased social unrest, and a current account surplus that 
was, once again, essentially the result of import compression. 
Hence, as evidence from tables 14.6 and 14.7 shows, it is 
impossible to grasp the movement into a financial crisis and 
economic downturn unless we start with the analysis of capital 
flows.
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2.2.2.3. Underlying Causes of Increased External Fragility.
There is some confusion in Turkey and elsewhere about the 
causes of financial crises. As discussed above, the underlying 
cause in the Turkish case is the impact (and, at times, positive 
and negative shocks) generated by large, uncontrolled capital 
movements with a large “hot” component within a fragile 
financial system. Weak prudential regulation of banks or large 
public deficits may aggravate the situation, but do not cause 
the collapse per se. And there is always an individual pretext 
that triggers the bust. A usual source of confusion is to see the 
pretext as the cause. Each case is unique in the sense that 
there are different events triggering financial disturbances. 
But crisis is ultimately the result of structural fragility 
generated by unregulated and chaotic capital movements and 
their impact on the financial cycle, without which the same 
trigger events would never have resulted in an economy‐wide 
havoc.
To be able to take better account of the disruptive mechanisms 
of this structural fragility, let us note the well‐known dilemmas 
faced by policy makers in a developing economy with an open 
capital account.  (p.431) On the one hand, as is the case with 
Turkey currently, fiscal stringency is imposed by the rules of 
the game and using fiscal tools as a short‐run macroeconomic 
policy option is off the agenda. On the other hand, under 
conditions of open capital accounts, the monetary authority 
can independently target either the nominal exchange rate or 
the interest rate, leaving the determination of the other to the 
interplay of market forces.
Evidence accumulated from developing country experiences in 
the last two decades overwhelmingly suggests that a 
liberalized capital account cannot be launched unless it is 
expected that a higher rate of return on domestic assets 
(deflated by the exchange rate) will be realized in comparison 
with the rate of return abroad. However, such a commitment 
favoring high domestic interest rates stimulates foreign 
inflows and leads to the appreciation of the domestic currency, 
further inviting an even higher level of hot money inflows into 
often shallow domestic financial markets. As a result, debt‐
financed public (e.g., Turkey) or private (e.g., Mexico and 
Korea) spending escalates. In order to accommodate this 
process, the central bank is forced to hold significant foreign 
exchange as reserves. In this setting, the only proper role 
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remaining for the monetary authority becomes that of 
monetary sterilization. Thus, the surge in the aggregate money 
supply is checked by restricting its domestic component. 
Consequently, domestic interest rates rise and the cycle 
recommences. Eventually, the bubble bursts as hot money 
rushes out of the country, and a series of severe and onerous 
macro adjustments takes place through very high real interest 
rates, sizable devaluations, and the severe entrenchment of 
aggregate demand.16
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2.2.3. Rising Leakages from Non‐resident Inflows
Capital account liberalization resulted in a rising gap between 
non‐resident inflows and the current account during the 
1990s, as has already been noted (see the first two rows of 
table 14.5). Factors contributing to the growing gap are not 
merely of theoretical interest. The cumulative current account 
deficit during the 1990s equaled $14.1 billion, whereas 
Turkey's external debt during the same period had risen from 
$42 billion to $102 billion—a dramatic increase of $60 billion, 
far in excess of the financing requirements of the current 
account. As long as the growth of the external debt is 
considered to be a policy issue, the analysis of factors that 
lead to the detachment of external borrowing and current 
account deficits becomes important in practical terms. Table 
14.6, above, provides the basic quantitative framework for 
depicting these factors.
The well‐known balance of payments (BOP) identity as 
depicted and defined in equation 1 in this chapter's appendix, 
that is, NKF(nr) + NKF(r) + EO + DR + CA = 0, constitutes the 
framework of table 14.6. The terms represent, respectively, net 
capital flows emanating from non‐residents, residents’ net 
flows, net errors and omissions, changes in reserves, and the 
current account balance. The same data can also be presented 
with slight modifications in terminology. By reversing the signs 
of the last four terms of the BOP identity, one can decompose 
the non‐resident inflows into current deficits and 
“leakages” (i.e., recorded and non‐recorded outflows by 
residents, and reserve accumulation). The conceptual 
framework for both representations is further elaborated in 
the appendix (see appendix equations 1 and 2).
Table 14.6 shows the striking change that occurs as a result of 
the liberalization of capital accounts after 1989. The ratios of 
NKF(r), EO, DR, and CA within net non‐resident flows,—that is,
NKF(nr)—should be interpreted as the share of each type of 
utilization to which non‐resident flows have been allocated. 
Findings on the values of each of the terms (and of the 
relevant ratios) during different phases of financial cycles as 
well as the cumulative sums for the 1980s and 1990s are 
summarized and analyzed in the following paragraphs of this 
section.
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A negative value for NKF(r) signifies recorded capital outflows 
by residents. It will be observed that during the 1990s, with 
the exception of the crisis year of 1994 (when residents acted 
in countercyclical fashion and engaged in net inflows), NKF(r)
was negative. In relative terms, their drain on the capital 
account was particularly heavy during the financial bust in 
1998 (when the current account was in surplus), as recorded 
resident outflows as a ratio of NKF(nr) rose to 94 percent. 
Comparing the 1980s with the 1990s, it is observed that 
capital controls really do make a difference. The ratio of the 
residents’ outflows to non‐residents’ inflows rose by 10 
percentage points from 22 to 34 percent during the latter 
decade.
Throughout this study, the “net errors and omissions” (EO)
item of the BOP statistics is treated as unrecorded capital 
movements by residents. A  (p.432) negative EO value is, 
thus, considered as capital flight.17 The liberalization of capital 
flows should, generally, be expected to transform unrecorded 
capital movements into recorded items by legalizing the 
former. This factor, together with improved statistical 
methods, should result in lower values, at least in relative 
terms for the EO item. This appears to be the case for a sample 
of sixteen emerging economies18 during the 1990s, compared 
with the preceding decade, when the share of capital flight (as 
represented by negative EO values) within non‐resident 
inflows declined from 11.1 to 6 percent (see table 14.6, column 
8, last two rows).
The Turkish experience, however, was directly the opposite. 
During the 1980s the net balance of the EO item was positive 
(i.e., 18.7 percent of NKF[nr]), probably owing to the reversal 
of capital flight that took place during the severe crisis of the 
late 1970s. This positive contribution would, thereby, offset 
most of the recorded residents’ flows, the cumulative sum of 
which was negative during the earlier decade (i.e., –22.4 
percent of NKF[nr]). The 1990s reversed the direction of 
capital flight by changing the cumulative EO item into negative 
values, and residents’ unrecorded capital movements as a 
ratio of total non‐residents’ flows were –6 percent. Thus, 
recorded and unrecorded capital movements by residents 
(NKF[r] + EO) together constituted a 40.4 percent drain on the 
non‐residents’ inflows—a radical deterioration that can only be 
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understood within the context of the liberalization of the 
capital account.
Under a regime of controlled mobility of international capital, 
the adequate level of reserves was traditionally regarded as 
three or four months of imports for covering the time lags 
between payments for imports and export receipts, as well as 
for offsetting temporary disequilibria in the current account. 
Capital account liberalization radically changed and 
broadened the criteria of reserve adequacy, and brought forth 
such indicators as the “ratio of reserves to short‐term debt 
plus the stock of portfolio equity,” the “ratio of foreign‐assets‐
to currency (usually M2Y),” and a minimum level in excess of 
the scheduled amortization of external debt. For example, 
after observing that “foreign exchange reserves and reserve 
policy played an important role in the recent financial crises,” 
in 1999 Alan Greenspan suggested that “countries could be 
expected to hold sufficient liquid reserves to ensure that they 
could avoid new borrowing for one year” (italics added).19
These new and drastic adequacy requirements for reserve 
levels have pushed most developing countries to move into an 
accelerated rate of reserve accumulation in “normal” periods. 
The outcome has been an additional and “expensive”20 drain 
on non‐resident inflows. However, the aforementioned drain of 
reserve accumulation on net inflows in Turkey does not show 
much change in the pre‐ versus post‐liberalization years (see 
column 8 in table 14.6). Period averages, however, were 
affected by the severe drain on Central Bank reserves in late 
2000, which pulled total reserve accumulation for that year to 
practically zero. Table 14.7 depicts the turbulence in capital 
movements that adversely affected the Turkish economy 
during the 2000–2001 crisis. Reserve accumulation amounting 
to $2.9 billion for the first three quarters of 2000 was reversed 
during the last quarter, when $2.5 billion in reserves were 
depleted. If the 2000 data are disregarded, between 1989 and 
1999 the net increase in reserves amounted to $19.9 billion, 
constituting 84 percent of the total increase ($23.8 billion) in 
the import bill; whereas the similar ratio for developing 
countries as a whole was 60 percent, which is still considered 
excessive.21
These developments in capital movements during the past 
decade are not limited to Turkey. For comparative purposes, 
the last two rows of table 14.6 present the data for sixteen 
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emerging economies (including Turkey) for the two decades. 
For all sixteen countries as well as Turkey, the share of current 
deficit financing out of non‐resident inflows has declined, but 
the decline is much more substantial for Turkey (i.e., from 67 
to 32 percent) compared with the others (from 54 to 43 
percent). During the last decade, the shares of recorded and 
unrecorded resident outflows have been substantially higher 
in Turkey and those of reserve accumulation have been 
similar. These findings suggest that the impact of capital 
account liberalization in Turkey on the reallocation of capital 
inflows has been much more substantial than in comparable 
emerging economies.
2.2.4. Arbitrage‐Seeking Short‐Term Capital (“Hot Money”) Flows
Another disturbing feature of capital flows during the 1990s is 
the increasing magnitude, both in absolute and relative terms, 
of hot money flows (see appendix 1 for the conceptual and 
empirical specification of hot money).
 (p.433) In a developing economy, hot money flows emerge 
from the arbitrage‐seeking activities of rentiers and banks 
(both non‐residents and residents) as well as of firms 
(essentially residents). The arbitrage returns, defined as the 
speculative gain for rentiers between the highest (nominal) 
interest offered in the domestic economy and the rate of 
(nominal) change in the exchange rate (defined as Turkish lira 
per dollar), are calculated in table 14.3, above. It should, 
however, be pointed out that the same variables similarly 
affect the behavior of banks borrowing abroad and moving 
into TL assets (e.g., government debt instruments) or firms 
borrowing in foreign exchange but spending in TL. The rate of 
return minus the risk premium compared with rates of return 
abroad determines the direction of hot money flows. Table 
14.8 provides empirical findings on hot money movements 
distinguished between residents and non‐residents. The 
following observations are worth noting.
1. The mere magnitude of gross short‐term capital 
movements must be a source of concern. Columns 2 
and 3 of table 14.3, above, report the gross flows of 
banks’ foreign credit acquisitions and repayments for 
the post‐1991 period. Even if we take into consideration 
that some of these figures include double counting due 
to the renewal of short‐term bank liabilities more than 
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once every year, the relevant magnitudes point at one 
of the most important sources of instability in the 
financial system.
2. It was predominantly short‐term arbitrage‐seeking 
(i.e., “hot”) capital movements that were affected by 
capital account liberalization in 1989.22 The net 
balance of 1990–2000 is negligible (i.e., $262 million). 
But if we include the dramatic outflows during the 
recent crisis, the net balance for “hot money” for the 
1990–2001 (January–September for the last year) 
period, thus, turns out to be –$13.1 billion.23 This is 
significantly different from the earlier decade when 
“hot” non‐resident inflows were of negligible 
magnitudes, but reverse capital flight acted as a 
positive factor in financing current deficits. It is 
observed that the 1989 turning point affected 
arbitrage‐seeking flows by raising non‐resident inflows 
substantially, particularly during the boom phases of 
the cycle but, more importantly, by reversing the 
direction of residents’ flows into recorded and 
unrecorded outflows, exceeding the total of hot money 
inflows since 1990.
3. Since “arbitrage seeking” is determined by the same 
variables regardless of the residence of the relevant 
agent, how can we explain the divergence between the 
actions of residents and non‐residents? Indeed, as 
briefly discussed earlier, residents had acted in 
countercyclical fashion during the 1994 and the 2000–
2001 crises (see table 14.8). Two (not necessarily 
mutually exclusive) hypotheses are worth testing 
empirically: one explanation is that residents might 
have contradictory expectations about the behavior of 
exchange rate movements and/or external agents’ 
greater willingness to take “moral hazard–based 
risks” (this ultimately turned out to be justified). 
Alternatively, resident rentier behavior may be a 
transitional
 Turkey, 1980–2000: Financial Liberalization, Macroeconomic (In)Stability, and Patterns of Distribution
Page 47 of 102
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an 
individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Bilkent University 
Library; date: 13 December 2018












(6) = (4)/(5) Net Hot 
Money (7) = 
(1) + (4)
1990–93 9,664 24,536 0.394 –12,278 –13,265 0.926 –2,614
1994 –5,913 –6,259 0.945 4,212 4,175 1.009 –1,701
1995–97 5,705 27,173 0.21 –3,233 –6,853 0.472 2,472
1998 2,267 3,677 0.617 –3,286 –5,331 0.616 –1,019
1999 2,907 8,646 0.336 –1,333 –2,076 0.642 1,574
2000 4,863 16,362 0.297 –4,572 –6,215 0.736 291
1980–89 2,454 15,529 0.158 213 –561 * 2,667
1990–2000 19,493 74,654 0.261 –19,231 –29,683 0.648 262
2001 (I–IX) –9,222 –10,283 0.897 –4,100 –3,495 1,173 –13,322
90–01 (I–IX) 10,271 64,371 0.16 –23,331 –33,178 0.703 –13,060
Sources: IMF, Balance of PaymentsStatistics and official Turkish data.
*Ratios are meaningless when signs of hot money and total flows are different.
 Turkey, 1980–2000: Financial Liberalization, Macroeconomic (In)Stability, and 
Patterns of Distribution
Page 48 of 102
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Bilkent 
University Library; date: 13 December 2018
 (p.434) phenomenon of one‐off portfolio diversification, 
the impact of which will wear off after the first substantial 
movement abroad is exhausted.
4. The shares of “hot money” within capital flows of 
both residents and non‐residents have risen 
substantially since the liberalization of capital accounts. 
For non‐residents, the “hot inflows”/total inflows ratio 
has risen by more than 5 percentage points to 26.1 
percent during 1990–2000 as compared with the 
preceding decade (with, however, a highly fluctuating 
pattern). For residents, “hot” outflows constitute 65 
percent of total outflows during the same period. Hot 
money movements are much more volatile than other 
capital flow categories, particularly when crisis periods 
are included.
5. The 1994 and 2000–2001 data in table 14.8 clearly 
show the contribution of hot money movements to the 
emergence and deepening of financial crises. Within 
eleven months following October 2000, net recorded 
and unrecorded hot money flows by non‐residents and 
residents reached –$13.3 billion and, to say the least, 
generated an extremely adverse and destabilizing 
impact on the economy.
To summarize, the liberalization of the capital account in 
Turkey in 1989 has pushed the economy into an unstable and 
risky path in four ways: (1) the fragility of the domestic 
financial system has increased substantially; (2) the growth 
path of the economy has become more volatile, subject to a 
newly emerging financial cycle, and the period between its 
boom and bust phases has shortened considerably; (3) drains 
or “leakages” out of inflows have increased in relative terms, 
and the external debt has grown at a pace totally unrelated 
with the external financing needs of economic growth; and, 
finally, (4) arbitrage‐seeking and short‐term capital (“hot 
money”) flows constitute a rising share of total capital 
movements from both residents and non‐residents, and this 
phenomenon has begun to destabilize the economy.
3. Economics of Macro Adjustment: Sources of Aggregate 
Demand
In order to trace the patterns of adjustment to financial 
liberalization, we will deploy a series of decomposition 
analyses of macro aggregates of final demand. Since 
liberalization, there have been substantial swings in the 
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parameters governing the demand “injections” (such as 
investments, government expenditures, and exports) and 
“leakages” (i.e., savings, taxes, and imports).
Much of the variability in aggregate demand in the Turkish 
economy is induced by the state's fiscal stance. The escalation 
of public deficits via ever‐rising costs of (internal) debt 
servicing became the dominant element in aggregate demand. 
The costs of domestic debt servicing were so explosive that, by 
as early as 1992, public savings had turned into deficits. By 
2000, interest costs on domestic debt reached 80 percent of 
the overall tax income of the public sector. In all likelihood, the 
disposable income of the public sector, itself, is likely to be 
negative by the end of 2001.
3.1. Decomposition of the Sources of Effective Demand
We will address these developments utilizing the analytics 
provided in Godley (1999) and Berg and Taylor (2001) where 
the following decomposition measure is applied over effective 
demand. At the sectoral level, total supply, X is given by the 
sum of GNP, Y, and imports, M. Total GNP, in turn, can be 
partitioned into private disposable income, Yp, and public 
disposable income, YG, loosely referred to as aggregate tax 
income, T. Thus Y = Yp + T.
Goods market equilibrium necessitates the balance of 
aggregate supply and demand (sum of private consumption, 
Cp; private investment, Ip; government expenditures, G; and 
net exports, E‐M). Denoting the following “leakage” 
parameters relative to aggregate GNP as
one can obtain the following version of the (Keynesian) 
multiplier function:
Here, Ip/sp, G/t, and E/m are the direct “own” multipliers of, 
respectively, investments, government expenditures, and 
exports. The overall impact of injections is scaled by the 
corresponding leakages of savings, tax burden, and import 
propensities.
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performance of Ip/sp < Y discloses the channeling of investable 
funds away from real fixed investment toward financial 
speculation targeted at the government's deficit financing and 
the securitization of domestic debt. Real exports as scaled by 
the import propensities, E/m, also fall short of GNP throughout 
the post‐liberalization era. The only two exceptions occurred 
in 1998 and then again in 1994—both being crisis years during 
which imports contracted severely.
How dependable is the source of G/t in sustaining growth in 
GNP? Or, in other words, should we regard the massive 
injection provided by the G/t as a healthy source of growth? To 
properly assess the impact of G/t, we further decompose G into 
its components. We deduct transfer expenditures from G
wherein the most important item is interest costs on domestic 
debt. We then carry out the same analysis by employing G* as 
real non‐interest government expenditures (on goods and 
services).
This revision sheds a totally new light over the state's stance 
as the source of demand. Real non‐interest government 
expenditures, scaled by t (G*/t), becomes much weaker as a 
source of injection in the first half of the 1990s. After 1994, 
the post‐crisis management severely reduced the G*/t
component. Even so, the public sector continued to provide a 
relatively stronger demand pull compared with exports. Thus, 
the foreign sector has continuously been a laggard throughout 
the whole post‐financial liberalization era. Private investments 
behaved comparably at par with public spending during 1994 
Figure 14.3  Decomposition of the 
Sources of Macroeconomic Demand (Real 
1980 Prices)
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through 1996. After then, however, investment lost all its 
impetus as limited domestic savings were channeled to the 
securitization of the fiscal deficits and financial savings 
dominated the incentives against fixed investments in the real 
sector. These patterns are portrayed in figure 14.4.
3.2. Deterioration of the Fiscal Balances
The post‐1988 period witnessed a drastic deterioration of the 
fiscal balances in Turkey. Public sector borrowing requirement 
(PSBR)/GNP ratios averaged 4.5 percent during 1981–1988 
but rose to 10.2 percent in 1991 and averaged 9.4 percent 
over 1990–1999. By the end of 1999, PSBR reached 15.1 
percent of GNP and is anticipated to rise even further in 2001. 




will be useful 







in table 14.9, 
which is 
based on real 
values of the 
fiscal 
accounts using 1987 prices.
Note that during 1988–1993, the major erosion has occurred 
in the factor revenues item, that is, in net factor income 
generated by the state economic enterprise system. Factor 
revenues of the state declined by 86 percent in five years (in 
real terms). The real erosion up till 1992 corresponds to 
approximately 5 percent of the GNP of that period. The swift 
upward movement in transfer expenditures started in 1992. 
Between 1991 and 1996, the increase was more than 125 
percent in real terms. The major item in this account was 
interest payments. The rise in domestic debt gave way to a 
rapid buildup of interest costs.
Figure 14.4  Decomposition of the 
Sources of Macroeconomic Demand (Real 
1980 Prices)
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On the revenue side, tax collections had registered modest 
improvements in real terms (by 50 percent up till 1993), but 
they started to decline thereafter (essentially owing to the 
erosion of direct taxes). The share of indirect taxes in the total 
rose from 59 percent in 1990 to 64 percent in 1997.
These developments led to a sharp collapse in the disposable 
income of the public sector, which declined by 45 percent in 
real terms. As we shall discuss, this decline had devastating 
effects and generated strong pressures on the provision of 
public services and/or raised the PSBR to unprecedented 
levels.
In this context, it is important to note a fundamental change in 
the financing of the PSBR, compared with the pre‐
liberalization period of the 1970s and 1980s. Data on the 
financing patterns of the PSBR suggest that, under the 
financially repressed conditions of the 1970s and early 1980s, 
the most direct method of deficit financing was through 
Central Bank advances (monetization). However, after 
embarking on the path of structural adjustment, especially 
with the removal of interest ceilings in a series of reforms 
throughout the 1980s, the Turkish private sector faced a new 
phenomenon: positive real rates of interest. Financial 
institutions and rentiers swiftly adapted to changes in the 
rates of interest during the 1980s, and the government found 
it much easier to finance its borrowing requirements from 
domestic borrowing through issues of government debt 
instruments (GDIs). This also enabled successive governments 
to bypass many of the formal constraints on their fiscal 
operations. Consequently, with the advent of full‐fledged 
financial liberalization after 1988, PSBR  (p.437)
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Table 14.9 Public Sector Balances (Real 1987 Prices, Billions TL)1




10,313.8 11,818.9 13,855.2 13,965.6 15,145.1 17,452.2 15,597.0 15,830.0 17,065.0 20,099.2 22,235.4 22,458.0
Direct 3,983.1 5,120.1 5,879.7 6,013.8 6,359.6 7,115.8 6,820.7 6,061.9 6,195.1 7,380.5 9,668.1 9,346.9






















9,866.1 10,587.0 12,095.6 10,196.4 9,966.8 9,498.1 8,083.3 8,779.7 7,755.4 11,912.6 9,919.9 7,351.5
Public 
Savings




–6,147.9 –5,938.0 –7,762.3 –6,516.7 –5,926.4 –7,224.9 –3,071.7 –3,553.3 –5,101.9 –6,570.7 –7,115.6 –6,889.0
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PSBR 4.8 5.3 7.4 10.2 10.6 12.1 7.9 5.2 8.8 7.6 9.2 15.1
Budget 
Balance












2.1 0.8 0.9 0.4 1.6 1.4 –1.7 –1.1 –0.9 –1.5 –2.0 0.6
Stock of 
GDIs 3




3.8 3.6 3.5 3.8 3.7 5.8 7.7 7.5 10.2 7.7 11.7 13.7
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1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 19992
Domesti
c Debt
2.4 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.8 4.6 6.0 6.2 9.0 6.7 10.6 12.6
Foreign 
Debt










41.7 48.5 40.7 41.7 58.6 48.9 53.1 52.4 57.8 52.4 49.5 49.3
Sources: SPO Main Economic Indicators; Undersecreteriat of Treasury, Treasury Statistics, 1980–1999.
1. Deflated by the wholesale price index.
2. Provisional.
3. Government debt instruments (government bonds + treasury bills). Exclusive of Central Bank advances and consolidated debts.
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 (p.438) financing relied almost exclusively on issues of GDIs to 
the internal market—especially to the banking sector.
The underlying characteristic of domestic debt management 
was its extreme short‐term outlook. Net new domestic 
borrowings, as a ratio of the stock of the existing debt, rose to 
almost 50 percent over the 1990s. This ratio increased to 58 
percent in 1992, indicating that each year the state had to 
resort to net new borrowing, reaching half of the stock of debt 
already accumulated. Thus, the public sector was trapped in a 
short‐term rolling of debt, or Ponzi financing. This clearly 
unsustainable process contributed to the so‐called confidence 
crisis of the 1990s. For this scheme to work, however, 
domestic financial markets required the continued inflow of 
short‐term capital inflows. This necessitated a combination of 
high real rates of interest, along with an appreciation of the 
lira.
3.3. Decomposition of the Fiscal‐Real Linkages
Given that the evolution of the financial sector has mostly 
been related to the debt‐servicing costs of a public sector with 
unsustainable amounts of debt, it would be illuminating to 
repeat the above decomposition exercise from the perspective 
of real‐financial linkages.
The equation system introduced in section 3.1, above, can be 
used to obtain the real‐financial balance within the domestic 
economy:
where ΔFp, ΔD, and ΔA stand, respectively, for the net change 
in financial claims against the private sector, in the 
government's domestic debt, and in foreign assets. Clearly, 
when the balance between the injections and withdrawals of 
any entity (the private sector, the government, or the rest of 
the world) is positive, then financial claims against that entity 
must be rising. So, for instance, when G > tY, it means that the 
government is accumulating debt. (Since in the Turkish 
context, the government's net foreign borrowing was virtually 
non‐existent during the 1990s—see table 14.8—this meant the 
buildup of domestic debt.) Similarly, E < mY indicates that net 
foreign assets of the home country are declining. Since it must 
be true that at any point in time
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the expansionary stance of the government (G > tX) must be 
matched by some other entity increasing its asset holdings or 
reducing liabilities. In the Turkish case, this primarily meant 
the buildup of domestic assets in the hands of the domestic 
banking sector (with injections of liquidity from the rest of the 
world via short‐term capital inflows). Under these conditions, 
banks’ assets mostly consisted of the domestic debt 
instruments of the government, while their liabilities were 
mostly short‐term foreign borrowings. This operation by itself 
deepened much of the fragility already existing in the system 
due to the mismatch between the maturity and currency 
compositions of domestic assets and foreign denominated 
liabilities.
This mismatch, often referred to as short positions of the 
banking system, reached almost $15 billion or about 7 percent 
of the GNP by the end of the decade, and increased the 
vulnerability of the banking system with a high devaluation 
risk. With the rise of the gap in the open positions of the 
banking system, the ongoing risk premium of new borrowing 
increased secularly until net capital flows reversed as in late 
1998, and again in November 2000. The necessary 
adjustments to bring the system back to the financial asset‐
liability stock‐to‐stock equilibrium were indeed onerous and 
painstaking.
Now utilizing the GNP identities once again, let us distinguish 
private from public consumption as Cp and Cg and Ip and Ig
respectively. Disposable income in the private sector channels 
either into private consumption, Cp, or into private savings, Sp. 
This works similarly for the public sector. We thus obtain
The two terms in the parentheses on the right‐hand side 
reflect, respectively, the private savings and the public 
savings. Denoting sG = (YG − CG)/YG, and using the remaining 
variables as defined above, we get a version of the 
decomposition equation above, this time reflecting the 
investment‐saving balances of the respective entities:
Table 14.10. documents the relevant parameters and the main 
indicators of the aggregate demand decomposition. The most 
striking observation is the negative saving performance of the 
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public sector beginning in 1992. This fact alone induces a 
severe  (p.439)
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Table 14.10 Sources of Aggregate Demand: Main Indicators and Parameters
sg sp m t Real GNP Real Ip/sp Real Ig/sg Real E/m Real G/t Real Non‐
Interest G/
t
1980 0.045 0.127 0.120 0.167 5,303.0 5,470.6 10,913.5 1,945.3 7,449.1 3,096.0
1985 0.077 0.210 0.189 0.141 6,688.2 3,494.7 7,778.1 6,017.1 9,701.3 2,981.1
1987 0.066 0.173 0.177 0.160 7,840.5 6,519.8 12,226.4 6,879.4 13,058.5 3,815.4
1988 0.068 0.204 0.176 0.156 7,955.4 6,692.9 9,839.4 8,454.4 12,467.8 3,884.7
1989 0.047 0.174 0.175 0.159 8,084.1 6,931.4 12,626.7 7,366.7 12,354.5 4,687.2
1990 0.034 0.186 0.174 0.167 8,843.7 7,349.5 22,254.8 6,724.2 13,801.9 5,753.1
1991 0.007 0.206 0.165 0.174 8,872.9 6,766.0 94,314.6 7,382.7 13,280.3 6,277.3
1992 –0.008 0.224 0.172 0.182 9,442.7 6,486.8 –77,942.3 7,835.2 13,642.3 6,628.0
1993 –0.027 0.254 0.192 0.181 10,212.7 7,338.3 –27,732.3 7,219.4 16,544.6 7,209.3
1994 –0.011 0.242 0.203 0.188 9,589.8 7,537.5 –31,843.7 10,050.1 13,530.4 5,924.1
1995 –0.001 0.222 0.241 0.171 10,349.7 9,187.0 –
465,263.4
8,454.4 15,430.6 6,467.8
1996 –0.017 0.215 0.274 0.169 11,087.3 10,385.2 –34,602.9 8,583.5 19,837.7 7,492.3
1997 0.005 0.205 0.298 0.183 12,007.6 11,912.2 158,963.3 9,713.1 19,215.5 7,883.9
1998 –0.019 0.235 0.272 0.191 12,471.8 9,571.7 –42,055.3 10,880.1 21,992.9 8,108.3
1999 –0.069 0.222 0.266 0.202 11,709.2 8,407.2 –10,582.5 10,116.7 22,725.3 8,697.8
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sg sp m t Real GNP Real Ip/sp Real Ig/sg Real E/m Real G/t Real Non‐
Interest G/
t
2000 –0.052 0.221 0.309 0.244 13,048.6 9,488.4 –16,655.0 9,977.4 21,740.6 7,439.7
Note: For symbols, see text. Real quantities are in billions TL, deflated by the GNP deflator (1980 = 100).
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volatility in the investment patterns, as IG/sG ratios become 
negative after 1992 (with the exception of 1997). This observation 
pertains despite the secular rise of the tax burden, t. The import 
coefficient is also observed to rise by almost twofold from 0.12 in 
1980, to 0.31 in 2000.
Much of the expansion in Ip/sp and E/m is absorbed by the 
negative saving performance of the public sector, and the 
abrupt financing demands of the government increase 
uncertainty and risk in the financial markets. It also increases 
the volatility of the money multiplier as the government calls 
for many auctions to dispose off its debt instruments.
4. Microlevel Adjustments in the Manufacturing Sector
In this section, we investigate the structural consequences of 
the post‐1980 outward orientation on market concentration 
and productivity in the Turkish manufacturing industries. To 
this end, we will refer to recent Turkish literature and report 
on the concentration tendencies and oligopolistic markup 
pricing practices prevalent in this sector. Furthermore, we 
shall employ a new set of decompositions on productivity and 
employment patterns to reveal the leading/lagging subsectors 
within manufacturing.
The period under analysis spans the overall transformation of 
the Turkish economy from domestic‐oriented, import‐
substitutionist industrialization to one emphasizing export 
orientation and integration with global markets. During this 
period, manufacturing has evolved as the leading sector, both 
in terms of the degree of its export orientation and as a focal 
area where distribution patterns between wage labor and 
capital have been reshaped.
Independent studies24 and rudimentary data from official 
agencies provide (both formal and anecdotal) evidence that 
one of the major structural deficiencies of manufacturing 
reveals itself in the rather loose association between export 
penetration gains and labor productivity, on the one hand; and 
the dismal patterns of employment, accumulation, and wage 
labor remunerations, on the other hand. This deformation is, 
in fact, a perennial feature of the post‐1980 structural 
adjustment era. In their analysis of the decomposition of labor 
productivity in manufacturing, Voyvoda and Yeldan (2001)
report that, since the inception of the structural adjustment 
reforms and outward orientation, the underlying sources of 
productivity gains have not significantly altered in this sector. 
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They find that none of the leading export sectors of the 1980s 
have generated sufficiently strong productivity contributions 
or admitted strong interindustry linkages to serve as the 
leading sectors propelling the rest of the economy.
Given this background, there exists considerable evidence on 
the extent of monopolization and high concentration in the 
Turkish manufacturing  (p.440) industries. The State Institute 
of Statistics data suggest, for instance, that the process of 
export orientation and overall trade liberalization since 1980 
has not affected the structural characteristics of the 
manufacturing industry. Many of the monopolistic sectors 
either kept their existing high rates of concentration or even 
suffered from increased monopolization as measured by their 
CR4 ratios or Hirfindahl indexes. Even among many 
competitive sectors of 1980, one observes increases in the 
CR4 ratios by 1996.25
These observations suggest that, contrary to expectations, the 
opening process was unable to introduce increased 
competition in the industrial commodity markets. Here we 
attempt to formalize these observations and deduce 
econometric hypotheses on the patterns of trade liberalization, 
concentration, and profitability. To this end, we will summarize 
the results obtained by Metin, Voyvoda, and Yeldan (2001a), 
who investigated these empirical questions using various 
panel data procedures. The relevant data cover twenty‐nine 
sub–sectors of Turkish manufacturing for the 1980–1996 
period. We focus on three sets of issues: (1) the effect of 
openness on the extent of market concentration, as measured 
by CR4 rates; (2) the behavior of gross profit margins 
(markups) in relation to openness, concentration rates, and 
real wage costs; and (3) the behavior of sectoral real 
investments in relation to markups, real wage costs, and the 
openness indicator.
4.1. Phases of Macroeconomic Adjustment in Turkish 
Manufacturing
Table 14.11 summarizes the main indicators of the 
manufacturing industry under the post‐1980 adjustments. To 
document the extent of the oligopolistic structure of the 
sector, we tabulate the rate of market concentration in the 
manufacturing industry subsectors by calculating the shares of 
the four largest enterprises in the total sales (revenues) of the 
sector (hence the acronym, CR4). Accordingly, we classify 
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those sectors with CR4 ratios above 30 percent as imperfectly 
competitive and those having CR4 ratios below this threshold 
as competitive.26 Data on other sectoral variables come from 
the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) Manufacturing Industry 
Annual Surveys. To arrive at “wage rates” and the “average 
labor product,” we have used data on “total wages paid” and 
“value‐added” divided, respectively, by “average number of 
workers engaged.” We have used the sectoral wholesale 
producer prices in deflating nominal magnitudes.
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Table 14.11 Evolution of the Turkish Manufacturing Sector under External Liberalization
Structural Adjustment 
Reforms
Outward‐Orientation Unregulated Financial 
Liberalization
Financial Crisis and 
Reinvigoration of Short 
Term Capital‐Led Growth




0.45 0.42 0.51 0.48
Employment/Total 
Manufacturing
0.58 0.59 0.62 0.65
Ratio of Trade Volume to 
Value Added
0.39 1.04 0.91 1.46
Share of Public Firms in 
Value Added
0.15 0.13 0.11 0.04
Share of Wages in Value 
Added
0.33 0.22 0.23 0.19
Annual Rate of Growth of
Real Wages (%)
2.77 –1.88 11.62 –7.92
Annual Rate of Growth of
Labor Productivity (%)
26.54 8.83 11.69 –2.01
Gross Profit Margins 
(Mark‐up)
0.28 0.33 0.39 0.38
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Structural Adjustment 
Reforms
Outward‐Orientation Unregulated Financial 
Liberalization
Financial Crisis and 
Reinvigoration of Short 
Term Capital‐Led Growth




0.55 0.58 0.49 0.52
Employment/Total 
Manufacturing
0.42 0.41 0.38 0.35
Ratio of Trade Volume to 
Value Added
0.67 1.04 0.89 1.59
Share of Public Firms in 
Value Added
0.62 0.53 0.43 0.42
Share of Wages in Value 
Added
0.28 0.14 0.21 0.14
Annual Rate of Growth of
Real Wages (%)
3.39 –3.15 15.41 –8.28
Annual Rate of Growth of
Labor Productivity (%)
83.25 12.71 8.53 3.24
Gross Profit Margins 
(Mark‐up)
0.34 0.46 0.49 0.53
Source: SIS Manufacturing Industry Annual Surveys and Manufacturing Industry Concentration Ratios.
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 (p.441)
Table 14.12
Open Sectors Inward‐Looking Sectors
Competitive 
sectors
312, 322, 381, 
383





351, 353, 382, 
384, 385, 390
313, 314, 324, 332, 341, 
342, 354, 355, 361, 362, 
371, 372
The periodization of table 14.11 follows the adjustment path of 
the overall economy as characterized and discussed in table 
14.12, above. Given our criterion of distinguishing individual 
sectors as competitive versus imperfectly competitive based 
on their CR4 ratios, we observe that eighteen of the twenty‐
nine sectors fall under the “imperfectly competitive and 
oligopolistic” group in 1980. Eight of them have CR4 ratios 
higher than 50 percent. By 1996, there was very little change 
in these subgroups. As of 1996, the share of value‐added in the 
imperfectly competitive sectors in the manufacturing total 
reached 51 percent. Furthermore, these sectors employed 31 
percent of total manufacturing employment in our database. In 
contrast, in 1980, the output share of the imperfectly 
competitive sectors was 55 percent and their employment 
share was 42 percent.
At the risk of overgeneralization, we can nevertheless confer a 
tendency for higher markup rates within the imperfectly 
competitive block. Petroleum refineries (353), soil products 
(361), and non‐metals (369) have the highest markup rates 
over 1994–1996 (of 1.07, 1.04, and 0.72, respectively). We 
further observe that growth in real wages has been 
consistently negative over the 1981–1988 and 1994–1997 
episodes, while real wage costs have been on an upward trend 
under the financial deregulation of 1989–1993. As of 1994–
1997, the highest share of labor costs in value‐added (0.27) is 
recorded in manufacture of footwear (324). This is followed by 
glass products (362) with 0.25, and paper and paper products 
(341) with 0.24. The dissociation between real wage 
movements and labor productivity is clearly visible over the 
classic export‐led manufacturing era from 1981 to 1988. Even 
though real wages seem to have caught up with real average 
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labor productivity over 1989–1993, this pattern falls short of 
its momentum, and by 1994–1997 real wages start a 
contractionary trend.
4.2. Econometric Investigation
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We now redirect our attention to the econometric investigation 
provided by Metin, Voyvoda, and Yeldan (2001; hereafter, 
MVY). We focus on the twenty‐nine subsectors of 
manufacturing based on three‐digit ISI‐Classification (the ISIC 
codes and their sectoral identification are laid out in appendix 
1, table 14.14).
MVY also rely on the initial classification based on the CR4 
ratios introduced above. Accordingly, those sectors that have a 
CR4 in excess of 0.30 are classified as “imperfectly 
competitive/oligopolistic” and those with a CR4 of less than 
0.30 are classified as “perfectly competitive.” On a different 
spectrum, sectors are regarded as “open” provided that their 
trade volume (measured as imports plus exports) as a ratio of 
sectoral value‐added exceed 0.50. Sectors with trade volume 
to value‐added ratios of less than 0.50 are regarded as 
“inward‐looking.” They carry this classification based on the 
characteristics of the twenty‐nine sectors in 1980. We thus 
obtain the following tabulation (see appendix 1, table 14.13, 
for identification of the ISIC codes).
MVY utilize two specifications: they first study the 
distributional issues and analyze the behavior of gross profit 
margins (markup rates) in relation to trade liberalization, 
sectoral concentration, and swings in real wage costs. 
Secondly, they analyze the patterns of accumulation, and study 
the behavior of sectoral investment (by destination) against 
the behavior of markup rates, real wage costs, and openness.
The two essential estimating equations are as follows:
The first implicit function represents the trade orientation and 
distributional aspects of the manufacturing industry. MRit
denotes markup rates, CR4it denotes concentration ratios, Oit
stands for the “openness” of each sector (ratio of imports plus 
exports to sectoral value‐added), and RWit denotes real wage 
costs. The second relationship tries to explain the process of 
capital accumulation using three possible determinants, 
namely markups, real wage costs, and openness, where RIit is 
the real investment of each manufacturing  (p.442) industry 
sector. The index {i = 1, 2, … N} refers to the individual unit, 
and {t = 1, 2, … T} refers to a given time period. The 
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coefficients αi (sector‐specific composite term) have two 
components: αi1, a sector specific intercept, and αi2t, a sector‐
specific deterministic growth trend.
The general form of the econometric specifications is assumed 
to be linear.
For trade orientation and distribution:
For accumulation:
MVY employ panel data estimation on specification (1') in six 
sets of equations. First, they estimate equation (1') for the 
whole sample, in other words for i = {1, 2, … 29} and t = 
{1980, 1981, … 1996}. Then, they take each of the identified 
cells as one individual group exclusively and redo the 
estimation. Finally, they distinguish those sectors that were 
“inward‐oriented” in 1980, but became “open” by 1996. That 
is, sectors i ∈ {2 and 4} in 1980 and i ∈ {1 and 3} in 1996. This 
leaves them with the following sectors: {311, 314, 321, 323, 
324, 331, 332, 341, 352, 355, 356, 362, 371, 372}. These are 
classified as “trade adjusters.”
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4.2.1. Distributional Indicators: Behavior of Gross Profit Margins
We start summarizing MVY's econometric investigation with 
the analysis of the behavior of gross profit margins (markups). 
Our highly detailed observations of the markups, as portrayed 
in table 14.11, reflect a general rise in the average profit 
margins despite the increased openness and the secular rise in 
wage costs after 1989.
To test these hypotheses, MVY regress markup rates on 
openness, concentration (CR4 ratios), and (the logarithm of) 
real wage costs using the panel data. The econometric results 
reveal the following relationship for the markup equation 
when all sectors are considered:
where αi is the sector‐specific term and t‐ratios are given in 
the parentheses. For the whole sample, the overall coefficient 
of openness is estimated to be a mere –0.004. The magnitude, 
which is found to be statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level, is nevertheless very small, suggesting that sixteen years 
of adjustment to foreign integration have not brought about a 
meaningful change in the market structure of the Turkish 
manufacturing industry. As such, the speed of adjustment of 
gross profit margins is revealed to be very slow in spite of 
import discipline or export penetration, and the technological 
and institutional barriers to entry seem to persist over the 
post‐1980 reform era.
Concentration rates, however, have a statistically significant 
and a higher (positive) coefficient of 0.181 at the 1 percent 
level. Thus, a 1 percent increase in the level of concentration 
as measured through the CR4 ratio is likely to affect the 
average profit margin of the sector by +0.18 percent. The a 
priori expectation that higher concentration levels would be 
indicative of higher profit margins is confirmed in the 
aggregate. What is more interesting, however, is that markups 
do have a positive relationship with respect to real wage costs 
(with a coefficient of 0.111). These observations suggest that 
the sector has been characterized by Sraffian dynamics, with 
the persistence of markups against wage increases. (Also see 
Boratav, Yeldan, and Köse 2000 and Yentürk and Onaran 1999
for a further assessment of the behavior of markups during the 
post‐1989 wage cycle in Turkish private manufacturing.)
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Across the subgroups, we observe that, in general, “open” 
sectors (as of 1980) have a negative relationship with 
“openness.” “Inward‐looking” (as of 1980) sectors, however, 
display a positive relationship against the same variable. Most 
importantly, “trade adjusters” carry a coefficient of +0.026 vis‐
à‐vis openness. Thus, for those sectors that were inward 
looking in 1980, the process of opening could not have been 
associated with a competitive squeezing of the cost margins 
(markups). On the contrary, it seems evident that the inward‐
looking sectors (as of 1980) have adjusted to the new trade 
environment by way of increasing their profit margins (with an 
estimated coefficient of +0.026 vis‐à‐vis openness). Trade 
adjusters, as a group, displayed positive coefficients in relation 
to the concentration indicator (CR4) and the real wage costs. 
Except for the “inward‐looking and imperfectly competitive” 
group, markups have positive relationship with real wage 
costs under all groups. Thus, generally speaking, it seems that 
the manufacturing sectors could have responded to the trade 
policy shocks and  (p.443) real wage costs by increasing their 
profit margins over the post‐1980 reform era.
4.2.2. Investment Behavior and Patterns of Accumulation
Now we turn our attention to the analysis of the behavior of 
sectoral investment in response to openness, markup rates 
(profitability), and real wage costs by regressing the logarithm 
of sectoral real investments against CR4, MR, and the 
logarithm of RW. The overall effect of profit margins on 
manufacturing real investment is quite strong, with an 
elasticity of 0.548. This suggests the presence of strong 
accelerationist investment patterns in the sector. Openness, 
though positive, carries a smaller coefficient—0.035 (yet, it is 
not found to be statistically significant).
MVY's estimated equation was reported as
The most interesting result is the estimated positive elasticity 
of real wages on real investment with a coefficient of +0.841 
that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In other 
words, real wages seem to act as an accelerator variable, 
stimulating real fixed investments in the manufacturing sector, 
while the effect of openness—as measured by the ratio of 
trade volume to value‐added—has been found to be 
insignificant. The unorthodox behavior of real wages in 
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stimulating both gross profit margins and real investments in 
a positive manner suggests the continued importance of 
domestic demand factors in the Turkish industrial commodity 
markets. These results concur with the findings of Yentürk and 
Onaran (1999) that post‐1980 Turkish manufacturing followed 
a wage‐led growth pattern.
5. Distributive Impacts and the Cost Structure of Value‐
Added
Turkey is known to suffer from one of the most skewed income 
distributions compared with countries that have the same level 
of development. This outcome is partly the legacy of prolonged 
import‐substitution growth patterns with excessive quota rents 
and an oligopolistic industrial and banking structure. Other 
reasons include the relatively stagnant and overpopulated 
agriculture sector, which has loose linkages to the domestic 
industry, high rates of immigration due to both economic and 
political pressures, and unequal access to education.
With commodity trade liberalization in 1980 and then financial 
liberalization in 1989, there were renewed orthodox 
expectations toward more equitable forms of distribution of 
the national product as import‐quota rents would be 
dissipated, and the domestic production structure would be 
transformed given the signals of efficiency (world) prices. It 
was further argued that, as the labor‐intensive domestic 
industries shifted toward export markets, labor would be able 
to increase its factor remunerations in real terms.
These orthodox prescriptions failed to operate, however, as the 
economy witnessed sharp shifts in the underlying economic 
polity with the emergence and administration of new modes of 
surplus extraction mechanisms throughout the course of 
“liberalization.” First and foremost, the pro‐liberal stance and 
the integration process of the domestic economy with world 
markets did not lead to a more competitive environment in the 
domestic industry. On the contrary, as discussed in section 4.2 
above, concentration rates in most of the outward‐oriented 
sectors (such as food processing, cement, glass production, 
and ceramics) did in fact rise sharply. Furthermore, the 
financing behavior of corporations did not show significant 
changes, and the banking sector became increasingly 
dissociated from credit financing and intermediation, and its 
focus evolved into the securitization of domestic debt.
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More generally, the post‐1980 integration process has 
invigorated new and intensified distributive tensions as the 
share of non‐wage income in national product rose, the 
marginalization of labor deepened, existing wage inequalities 
between skilled and unskilled labor intensified, and social 
safety nets became increasingly inaccessible.
Let us take a closer look at the increased wage gap between 
the skilled/organized and the unskilled/marginal segments of 
the labor force. Köse and Yeldan (1998) categorize “informal/
marginal” labor as that part of the employed labor force that is 
not officially registered under any social security coverage and 
is also not entitled under the “self‐employed or employer” 
status. Based on the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) 
Household Labor Survey data, Köse and Yeldan report that the 
ratio of marginal labor to total employment in industry 
increased to 49 percent in 1994 from 41 percent in 1980. This 
form of employment was very extensive in traditional sectors 















the wage gaps between the large/small and public/private 
enterprises widened significantly and exceeded the wage gap 
magnitudes of the early 1980s. In particular, the highly organized 
mining and electricity/gas workers improved their relative 
economic positions significantly. Wages in the clothing industry 
compared with manufacturing averages, on the other hand, eroded 
by 20 percentage points over the post‐1980 liberalization period 
(Köse and Yeldan 1998; Boratav, Yeldan, and Köse 2000; Yentürk 
1999).
Given the extent of polarization indicated by these numbers, it 
is clear that the “traditional” explanations of income inequality 
(such as unequal access to education, unequal distribution of 
assets and land concentration, and urban bias) are not 
Figure 14.5  Functional Distribution of 
Income, Turkey: 1970–1998
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sufficient in explaining the macroeconomic processes that give 
rise to such an outcome. Even though generalizations can be 
misleading, one can nevertheless associate rising income 
inequality and labor marginalization with the informalization 
of industrial relations, new technological advances that favor 
skill‐intensive production patterns, and an unequivocal trend 
toward the dissociation of the financial sector from the 
productive sphere of the economy, coupled with the 
concomitant expansion of financial rents.
A careful inquiry along these lines will necessitate a shift of 
focus toward the functional categories of income and the 
underlying processes of macro adjustment. We turn to these 
issues in the next section.
5.1. Indicators of the Functional Distribution of Income: The 
Evidence
Given data constraints, it is common practice to separate 
agricultural income from non‐agricultural income sources. 
Among non‐agricultural activities, we found it possible to 
distinguish the following entities: interest income, profits, 
rental income, and public and private wage income.
Figure 14.5 documents the distributional consequences of the 
post‐1980 financial deregulation episode given this 
breakdown. The share of interest income within aggregate 
domestic income is observed to stand around 15.2 percent by 
1998, reaching almost the total value‐added of agriculture—a 
sector that houses 45 percent of the civilian labor force. The 
share of interest income was virtually zero in 1980.27
Over the long run, the overall decline in agricultural and wage 
and salary income is phenomenal: the share of agricultural 
income fell by almost half in the course of the last three 
decades. The wage cycle, on the other hand, displays a rising 
trend in the 1970s  (p.445) and follows a declining course 
throughout the outward orientation of the domestic economy 
in the 1980s. The share of non‐agricultural wage labor 
reached its lowest score in 1986 to 17.1 percent from its peak 
of 36.8 percent realized in 1977. Such an extensive fall clearly 
reflects the faltering employment response of the domestic 
industry to significant reductions in real wages. The 
implication is that the scope for capital‐labor substitution has 
been highly limited in the Turkish economy.
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Given this background, it would be illuminating to trace the 
dynamics of the real earnings of wage labor against (labor) 
productivity growth over an extended time horizon. In what 
follows, we decompose variations in the average product of 
labor and the real wage rate in the Turkish industry to obtain 
their underlying long‐term trends. We make use of the 
Hodrick‐Prescott filtering methods to disintegrate the cyclical 
variations in productivity growth and wage rates from their 
respective historical trends. This exercise enables us to isolate 
the underlying trend paths of the two variables, and to make 
inferences about the evolution of the wage cycle against the 
long‐term productivity patterns in Turkish industry.
Data for our analysis come from the Manufacturing Industry 
Annual Surveys reported by the State Institute of Statistics. 
For the “wage rate” series, we have used “total wage 
earnings” divided by “total workers engaged in production.” 
The average labor product is derived by dividing “total value 
added” by the same labor employment magnitude. Both series 
are deflated by the wholesale price index and are filtered in 
logarithmic form. The exercise covers the time period 1950 to 
1996.
The results of the filter are portrayed in figures 14.6 and 14.7. 
The units on the y‐axis are in real 1963 TL prices in log scale. 
In figure 14.6, we observe the historical trend of the real 
average labor product in Turkish manufacturing. The trend 
has a secular upward slope with an average rate of annual 
growth of 3.8 percent for the whole time horizon (1950–1996). 
This is in contrast with the trend of the real wage rate 
portrayed in figure 14.7. The trend in real wages fluctuates 
with an increasing trend until mid‐1970s, a deceleration 
between 1980 and 1988, and recovery following 1989. The 
observed recovery in real wage is clearly the end result of the 
post‐1989 populism that enabled sharp increases in real wages 
between 1989 and 1993 (as narrated in section 3, above). 
Given this record of events, it seems plausible to argue that 
the post‐1989 upswing in manufacturing real wages was in 
fact in line with the real average product of labor as far as the 
long‐term trends of the two series are concerned.28
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 (p.446)
Fluctuations 


















remunerations and labor productivity in manufacturing 
industries. The trend path of real wages clearly signals a break 
following 1979–1980. This is the era when the domestic 
economy underwent significant transformation as it sought 
integration with global commodity and asset markets. The 
ongoing wage suppression as manifested by the downswing in 
the wage cycle indicates that adjustments in the labor markets 
served as one of the main mechanisms in bringing forth this 
transformation. Implemented under military rule with severe 
restrictions against collective bargaining and unionization, 
cost savings on wage labor were instrumental in the extraction 
of an economic surplus, which, in turn, was oriented toward 
export markets via a generous export‐subsidization program.
From a different perspective, the sharp contrast between the 
trend of labor productivity against real wage earnings 
following the 1980 transformation clearly displays the extent 
of dissociation between the productive sphere of the domestic 
Figure 14.6  Real Average Labor 
Productivity in Large Private 
Manufacturing: H‐P Filtered Trend
Figure 14.7  Real Wages in Large Private 
Manufacturing: H‐P Filtered Trend
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economy from its indigenous processes of accumulation and 
distribution. As the internationalization of the commodity and 
financial markets intensified, the links between savings 
generation and the productive use of such funds in enhancing 
capital accumulation—the process of intermediation—were 
severed. With the complete deregulation of the financial sector 
and the consequent ascendancy of finance over industry, 
international finance capital—whose singular goal is 
immediate financial gain rather than long‐term economic 
development and sustainable growth—was able to assume a 
dominant role in the economy.
5.2. Decomposition of the Structure of Costs
Given aggregate GNP, we can deduce its components in the 
following manner. Let PY be the nominal GNP, then
where iD is interest income generated in the economy; rN is 
rental costs; Π is aggregate profits; WpLp and WgLg are wage 
costs in the private and public sectors, respectively; and A is 
agricultural income.
If we add import costs (in domestic currency), eP*M, we get 
this breakdown of the costs of aggregate (nominal) supply:
where Π is the share of profits in total output.
 (p.447) Let the debt to output ratio be d  =  D/PX, the real 
import/output ratio be m  =  M/X, and the real exchange rate 
be z  =  eP*/P. Denoting n = N/PX, lp = Lp/X, lg = Lg/X, wp = 
Wp/P, wg = Wg/P, and a = A/PX, we obtain the structural 
breakdown of the unit costs:
We provide the relevant data and the associated calculations 
in table 14.3. The breakdown of unit costs is portrayed in 
figure 14.8.
Aggregate real GNP is observed to rise at an annual average 
rate of 4.4 percent over 1990–1998. The expansion of the 
share of interest is phenomenal. The share of iD increased 
from 0.049 in 1990 to 0.119 in 1998. This translates into an 
annual increase of 17.7 percent over the same period. Import 
costs likewise are about one‐fifth of the aggregate cost of 
production. The rise of import costs comes to an average rate 
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of increase of 10.4 percent per annum. The share of wage 
costs in the public sector fluctuated through the 1990s. From 
as low as 0.077 in 1988, public sector wage labor succeeded in 
raising its share up to 0.166 in 1992, but began a rapid decline 
falling to 0.096 in 1996. Private sector wage cost is observed 
to be more stable, and its share hovers around 0.10–0.12. 
Profits are another fairly stable entity in the cost structure, 
capturing about a third of unit costs. A decline in the making 
is visible after 1995, however, as interest servicing costs 
expand their share at the expense of non‐agricultural, non‐
wage factorial incomes.
6. Conclusion
In this chapter we have tried to identify and study the main 
stylized facts and processes characterizing the dynamic 
macroeconomic adjustments in Turkey since the inception of 
its post‐1980s globalizing reforms. The Turkish adjustment 
experience reveals the process by which a developing market 
economy is trapped by the demands of integration with world 
markets and the distributional requirements warranted by 
such reorientation. The state apparatus became the bastion of 
privilege regulating the mode of income redistribution within 
society. The elements of this redistribution involved both direct 
mechanisms of attaining favorable production and export 
subsidies, currency depreciation, and wage suppression, as 
well as indirect mechanisms such as tax evasion on capital 
incomes and a financial market development strategy that 
enabled massive income transfers to the rentier class.
 (p.448) Our 
decompositions of the components of aggregate demand 
reveal that the increased financial demands of the public 
sector dominate much of the process. Yet government 
Figure 14.8  Decomposition of the 
Structure of Costs
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expenditures, swamped as they are by interest servicing costs 
on domestic demand, do not provide a sustained impetus to 
the rest of the economy. Furthermore, operating under a 
regime of open capital markets, the economy is trapped in a 
vicious circle of high real interest rates, an overvalued 
domestic currency, and increased volatility in the flows of 
speculative short‐term foreign capital.
Existing data reveal very little structural change in the 
sectoral composition, market concentration, and behavior of 
profit margins under the post‐1980 Turkish structural 
adjustment reforms and outward orientation. It is also notable 
that the sectors that are characterized by high concentration 
coefficients do not necessarily reflect high shares of public 
ownership, and that reductions in the share of public 
companies do not directly lead to an increase in the degree of 
competitiveness. As such, the change in market concentration 
is revealed to be very slow in spite of the import discipline or 
export penetration; and the technological and institutional 
barriers to entry persist over the post‐1980 reform era.
These results suggest the continued importance of domestic 
demand in the Turkish industrial commodity markets and an 
overall wage‐led growth pattern with both profit margins and 
real wages acting as accelerationist variables to stimulate 
fixed investments.
Appendix 1: Capital Movements: Definitions, Data, and 
Method
The IMF, in its Balance of Payments Manual, 1993 (5th 
edition), made a number of changes in the conceptual 
framework of the capital and financial account of balance of 
payments (BoP) statistics. As a result, capital movements 
emanating from residents or non‐residents, from non‐official 
(i.e., banks and “other sectors”) and official (i.e., general 
government and monetary authorities) agents, can be 
distinguished, together with the types of assets and liabilities 
that constitute the content of capital movements. The 
quantitative analysis of capital flows in general and “hot 
money” (i.e., arbitrage‐seeking, short‐term private capital), in 
particular, as presented in tables 14.3–7, are based on this 
improved conceptual framework adopted by Turkish BoP 
statistics as well.
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A Decomposition Based on the Balance of Payments 
Identity
Let us denote net capital flows emanating from non‐residents 
by NKF(nr), from residents by NKF(r), net errors and 
omissions by EO, reserve movements as DR, and the current 
account balance as CA. The well‐known balance of payments 
(BoP) identity is expressed as follows:
For a typical developing economy, the usual signs observed 
during “normal periods” are (+) for NKF(nr) and (−) for the 
other terms. This means that residents engage in net recorded 
capital outflows; errors and omissions are interpreted as 
reflecting residents’ unrecorded capital movements, and the 
net outcome is capital flight; reserves tend to increase; and 
the current account chronically generates a deficit. These are 
not rigid generalizations: in individual years, there may occur 
net repatriation of non‐residents’ assets (i.e., NKF(nr) → 0); 
residents may engage in net repatriation of their external 
assets or reverse capital flight may occur (i.e., NKF(r) → 0 and 
EO → 0); and reserves may decline, or the current account may 
generate a surplus (i.e., DR → 0 and CA → 0). However, 
empirical findings for developing countries as a whole or for 
the subgroup of “emerging markets” have shown that 
cumulative sums of each of the above categories have 
generated the “usual” signs for a few years or for the full 
financial cycle.29 This observation enables us to reformulate 
the decomposition of nonresidents’ inflows. Let us first 
reformulate equation (1) as follows:
Since the terms in the right‐hand side (RHS) of the equation 
usually have negative signs, let us reverse the signs and 
rename the terms: –NKF(r) becomes net capital outflows by 
residents, denoted by NKO(r); –EO becomes capital flight by 
residents denoted by KFL; –DR becomes reserve accumulation, 
denoted by RAC; and –CA becomes current account deficit, 
denoted as CD. It would be helpful if we also rename NKF(nr)
without any change of sign as net capital inflows by non‐
residents, denoted as NKI(nr). Hence, with the signs reversed 
in the RHS and the terms renamed, equation (1a) is 
transformed into the following decomposition: (p.449)
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1.314 0.104 0.147 1.704 0.168 0.160 –0.035 –0.206
Beverage 
Industries




3.007 0.042 0.058 0.939 –0.516 0.061 0.042 –0.081
Manufacture 
of Textiles




1.690 0.013 0.031 13.026 4.214 0.117 –0.217 –0.052
Manufacture 
of Wood and 
Cork 
Products
1.607 0.007 0.016 1.529 –0.030 0.010 0.001 –0.027
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0.546 0.271 0.013 0.466 –0.052 0.140 –0.013 0.243
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1.370 0.066 0.074 1.705 0.141 0.103 –0.013 –0.091
Basic Metal 
Industries





1.524 0.029 0.049 2.070 0.216 0.054 –0.016 –0.074
Manufacture 
of Machinery





1.804 0.034 0.039 3.043 0.442 0.089 –0.021 –0.048
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 (p.450)
The interpretation of the decomposition (2) is as follows: a 
typical capital‐scarce developing country chronically 
generates current deficits in its external accounts. These 
deficits as well as additional foreign exchange demands due to 
residents’ (recorded and unrecorded) capital outflows and 
reserve accumulation can, in the medium run, only be 
“financed” through net inflows from non‐residents. Hence, net 
inflows from external agents, that is, NKI(nr), are allocated to 
finance both the “leakages,” or “drains,” that is, (NKO(r) + 
KFL + RAC) and CD. Transitionally, some of the terms in the 
RHS of equation (2) may take negative signs and appropriate 
interpretations follow. Residents may repatriate their external 
assets in net terms. Reserve depletion and current surpluses 
may occur whereby the relevant terms are expressed as 
negative terms on the RHS. However, the decomposition logic 
loses its significance when the sum total of the RHS terms, 
and consequently, NKI(nr) is negative—a phenomenon that can 
be expected to occur only exceptionally (under serious 
financial crisis) in a developing country, for example Turkey in 
1994, Mexico in 1995, or East Asia in 1997–1998.
It will be noticed that table 14.2 has used the conventional 
signs of the BoP accounts as expressed in equation 1 rather 
than the decomposition terminology of equation 2. However, in 
reading and interpreting table 14.2, it will be helpful to keep 
the decomposition logic in mind. Hence, the negative values of 
the ratios in the last four columns of table 14.2, can (after 
mentally reversing the signs) be read as the shares of the 
current deficit and the relevant “leakage” items out of non‐
residents’ net capital inflows.
Arbitrage‐Seeking, Short‐Term, Private Capital (“Hot Money”) 
Movements
Short‐term private capital flows, with the exception of trade 
credits, can be considered as constituting a broad definition of 
hot money movements engaged by banks, institutional and 
private rentiers, and firms. Within the new framework of BoP 
statistics, this broad category may be disaggregated into the 
following items:
Zero values for some of the items do not necessarily imply the 
absence of the relevant transborder transaction. Improved 
recording also results in the change from zero values into 
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positive or negative figures. For example, it is known that non‐
residents have been purchasing and selling Turkish treasury 
bills, but they have not as yet been recorded within the correct 
item (i.e., 4680). The relevant figures are registered elsewhere 
in the capital account, for
Table 14.14 “Hot Money” Items within the 
Framework of Standard Balance of Payments 
Statistics































Bank to bank 
loans
Short‐term 























4795 (0) (0) 4745 (0) (0)
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Note: Figures in parentheses are Turkey's 1997 and 1998 
values in million dollars for the relevant item.
 (p.451) example within 4783 and/or as another unrecorded 
quantity within the EO item. (Note that Mexican BoP data show 
zero values for the 4680 item up till the end of 1993, but register 
negative values for the following two years [–1.9 and –13.8 billion 
dollars in 1994 and 1995 respectively] and positive values 
thereafter. Negative values for the 4680 item in 1993–1994 signify 
the sale of Mexican government debt papers by non‐residents; the 
earlier purchase of which should have been recorded as positive 
[instead of zero] values for the same item in the preceding years. 
Once again, earlier inflows have, evidently, been recorded 
elsewhere.)
These observations suggest that it is too early to treat 
individual items of the capital and financial accounts of the 
BoP statistics in Turkey (and elsewhere) as reliable and 
undertake a quantitative analysis based on these specific 
variables. However, the sum total of “hot money” flows 
emanating from non‐residents’ as well as residents’ “hot” 
capital movements are, essentially, reliable magnitudes. In 
other words, the distinction between residents and non‐
residents in transborder transactions is much more reliable 
than the specific item in which the specific quantity is 
recorded. This is the reason for distinguishing “hot money” 
figures only between residents and non‐residents in table 14.3
without going into the individual items behind the two totals.
Notes
(1.) This observation holds despite the overall continuity of the 
neoliberal regime with the program of economic liberalization 
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and market‐led adjustment put into full force during the early 
1980s by the military government and its civilian successors.
(2.) See Yeldan (1995, 1998) for a discussion on the 
characteristics of the post‐1989 Turkish macro adjustments in 
terms of the creation and absorption of the economic surplus 
and a quantitative analysis of the strategic role played by the 
state apparatus. Önis and Aysan (2000); Cizre‐Sakallioǧlu and 
Yeldan (2000); Boratav, Türel, and Yeldan (1996); Ekinci 
(1998); and Boratav, Yeldan, and Köse (2000) provide similar 
analyses based on the effects of international speculative 
financial capital flows on the Turkish economy.
(3.) Yeldan (2001a), Boratav and Türel (1993), Şenses (1994), 
Uygur (1993), and Celasun (1994) provide a thorough 
overview of the post‐1980 Turkish structural adjustment 
reforms.
(4.) Anti‐labor legislation from the early 1980s was effectively 
utilized by Özal's government up till the late 1980s.
(5.) See Yeldan (2001a); Ertugrul and Selcuk (2001); Cizre‐
Sakallioǧlu and Yeldan (2000); Balkan and Yeldan (2001, 
1998); Selçuk (1997); Boratav, Türel, and Yeldan (1996); 
Ekinci (1998); and Yentürk (1999) for an extensive discussion 
of the post‐financial liberalization macroeconomic adjustments 
in Turkey. Metin, Voyvoda, and Yeldan (2001b) study the 
stylized facts of the macro adjustments using detrending 
techniques of the business‐cycles literature.
(6.) See appendix 1 of this chapter on definitions, data, and 
method related to the presentations in tables 14.4–6.
(7.) The contrast with the boom year of 2000 (when a 6.1 
percent GNP growth generated current deficits equal to 4.9 
percent of GNP) suggests that complacency on this issue may 
be premature (see note 8, below).
(8.) See section 2.2.4 and table 14.7.
(9.) There was also a significant amount of financial 
investment by households in the so‐called super T‐bills (that 
offered 400 percent interest rates with a three‐month 
maturity) financed by switching from unrecorded forex 
holdings. Although such currency switching from unrecorded 
to recorded assets may not incorporate cross‐border capital 
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movements, it is reflected as positive values in the “net errors 
and omissions” item that, in the methodology followed in this 
paper, are considered as reverse capital flight by residents.
(10.) Savings deposits were insured at 100 percent since the 
1994 crisis. Additionally, a scandalous provision imposed by 
the IMF during the negotiations for the additional standby 
agreement in December 2000 extended the guarantee to 
bankrupt banks’ external debts. Hence, international banks’ 
bad loans to Turkish banks are henceforth guaranteed and to 
be covered by the Turkish exchequer. The “moral hazard” 
dimension of this provision goes without saying, and there is 
no estimate on the magnitude involved.
(11.) During the first eleven months of 2000, exports remained 
practically unchanged but imports rose by 37 percent, more 
than doubling the trade deficit to 25 billion dollars. The 
adverse effects of the 1994 Customs Union treaty with the EU 
on the trade balance were delayed because of the substantial 
devaluation that same year, whose protective effects continued 
to prevail during the following five years of mild appreciation. 
These favorable conditions were reversed in 2000 not only 
because of the faster rate of appreciation of the Turkish lira 
vis‐à‐vis the currency basket but also because of the 
depreciation of the euro vis‐à‐vis the dollar.
(12.) Yet the realized external disequilibria should have come 
as no surprise to the IMF. Past experience of all exchange 
rate–based stabilization programs show that they initially 
generate a demand‐based expansion accompanied by rising 
and usually unsustainable trade and current deficits, followed 
by a contractionary phase—the magnitude of which depends 
on the size of the earlier external deficits. An overview of such 
exchange rate–based disinflation and stabilization is 
summarized in Calvo (2001); Calvo and Vegh (1999); Calvo, 
Reinhart, and Vegh (1995); Amadeo (1996); Agenor (2000); 
Akyuz and Cornforth (1999); Diaz‐Alejandro (1985); Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999); Frenkel (1995); and Agenor and Montiel 
(1999, ch. 8). For individual country experiences, see Corbo 
(1985), on Chile; Patinkin (1993) and Bruno (1993) on Israel; 
and Frenkel and Fanelli (1998) on Argentina. The IMF itself 
had access to a series of interim reports and staff papers 
documenting such possible effects on the financial market. 
See, for example, Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998).
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(13.) There were, without doubt, additional complications. The 
number of banks transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance 
Fund kept increasing throughout 2000. Most of their owners 
faced criminal charges and were arrested. The shock and 
apprehension of the financial community was aggravated 
when the newly established Board of Banking Supervision and 
Regulation called on the banks to reduce the open positions 
between their foreign exchange liabilities and assets to the 
pre‐set limits by the end of the year. This resulted in additional 
foreign exchange demand.
(14.) The weighted average of interest rates on 2000 auctions, 
that is, 36 percent deflated by 20 percent (i.e., the change in 
the nominal exchange rate).
(15.) $8.1 billion in IMF credits between November 2000 and 
June 2001 financed part of the reserve depletion of $15.2 
billion.
(16.) Elements of this vicious cycle are further studied in 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); Adelman and Yeldan (2000); 
Diaz‐Alejandro (1985); and are more recently referred to as 
the Neftci‐Frenkel cycle in Frenkel 1998.
(17.) This interpretation is shared by many researchers. 
Unrecorded current account operations, for example 
smuggling as well as foreign exchange movements in and out 
of the formal sector, without any cross‐border transactions 
taking place are also reflected in the EO item. The latter 
interpretation appears to be more valid for Africa.
(18.) The sixteen countries covered are Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, 
Thailand, and Turkey.
(19.) UNCTAD (1999), 110–11.
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(20.) The differential between the rate at which reserves are 
borrowed and the return on the international assets at which 
they are invested represents the net loss on reserve 
accumulation. This resembles the case of a head of household 
in a developing country who borrows from the bank and then 
puts the borrowed money in a deposit account at the same 
bank. These two transactions that generate a net loss to the 
household may appear totally absurd and irrational; but in 
fact, have a logic of their own if the deposit account is used to 
“gain respectability” from the consular office of, say, Australia, 
to which he has applied for a visa.
(21.) UNCTAD (1999), 108.
(22.) The only non‐hot capital movement that was affected by 
the 1989 liberalization was, probably, the FDI abroad of 
residents.
(23.) Note that period coverage for recent hot money 
movements in tables 14.7 and 14.7b are different: the former 
(row 9) covers the first three quarters of 2001, whereas the 
latter incorporates the last two months of 2000 additionally.
(24.) See, for example, Boratav, Yeldan, and Köse (2000); 
Onaran (2000); Yeldan and Köse (1999); Filiztekin (1999); 
Ercan (1999); Pamukçu and de Boer (1999); Köse and Yeldan 
(1998); Yentürk (1997, 1999); Uygur (1996); Kepenek (1996); 
Şenses (1996); Bulutay (1995); and Maraşlioǧlu and Tiktik 
(1991).
(25.) See, for instance, Metin, Voyvoda, and Yeldan (2001a); 
Güneş (1996); Kaytaz, Altin, and Güneş (1993); Katircioǧlu 
(1990); and Şahinkaya (1993) for the evaluation of market 
concentration and patterns of oligopolistic markup pricing in 
the industrial commodity markets. Güneş, Köse, and Yeldan 
(1996), in turn, document comprehensive panel data on the 
degree of concentration in Turkish manufacturing using the 
standard Input‐Output classification for the period 1985–1993.
(26.) This is the threshold used by Boratav, Yeldan, and Köse 
(2000) and Yeldan and Köse (1999), where, on a further level 
of finesse, the sectors that had CR4 ratios between 30 and 49 
percent are classified as “monopolistically competitive,” and 
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sectors with CR4 ratios exceeding 50 percent are regarded as 
“oligopolistic.”
(27.) All income data are inclusive of taxes and are in gross 
terms.
(28.) See Boratav for a narrative support of this claim.
(29.) See UNCTAD 1999, table 5.2. Consolidated African data 
for 1980–1998 generate the same signs except for the EO 
item, which tends to be positive (UNCTAD 2000, table 3).
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(1.) This observation holds despite the overall continuity of the 
neoliberal regime with the program of economic liberalization 
and market‐led adjustment put into full force during the early 
1980s by the military government and its civilian successors.
(2.) See Yeldan (1995, 1998) for a discussion on the 
characteristics of the post‐1989 Turkish macro adjustments in 
terms of the creation and absorption of the economic surplus 
and a quantitative analysis of the strategic role played by the 
state apparatus. Önis and Aysan (2000); Cizre‐Sakallioǧlu and 
Yeldan (2000); Boratav, Türel, and Yeldan (1996); Ekinci 
(1998); and Boratav, Yeldan, and Köse (2000) provide similar 
analyses based on the effects of international speculative 
financial capital flows on the Turkish economy.
(3.) Yeldan (2001a), Boratav and Türel (1993), Şenses (1994), 
Uygur (1993), and Celasun (1994) provide a thorough 
overview of the post‐1980 Turkish structural adjustment 
reforms.
(4.) Anti‐labor legislation from the early 1980s was effectively 
utilized by Özal's government up till the late 1980s.
(5.) See Yeldan (2001a); Ertugrul and Selcuk (2001); Cizre‐
Sakallioǧlu and Yeldan (2000); Balkan and Yeldan (2001, 
1998); Selçuk (1997); Boratav, Türel, and Yeldan (1996); Ekinci 
(1998); and Yentürk (1999) for an extensive discussion of the 
post‐financial liberalization macroeconomic adjustments in 
Turkey. Metin, Voyvoda, and Yeldan (2001b) study the stylized 
facts of the macro adjustments using detrending techniques of 
the business‐cycles literature.
(6.) See appendix 1 of this chapter on definitions, data, and 
method related to the presentations in tables 14.4–6.
(7.) The contrast with the boom year of 2000 (when a 6.1 
percent GNP growth generated current deficits equal to 4.9 
percent of GNP) suggests that complacency on this issue may 
be premature (see note 8, below).
(8.) See section 2.2.4 and table 14.7.
(9.) There was also a significant amount of financial 
investment by households in the so‐called super T‐bills (that 
offered 400 percent interest rates with a three‐month 
maturity) financed by switching from unrecorded forex 
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holdings. Although such currency switching from unrecorded 
to recorded assets may not incorporate cross‐border capital 
movements, it is reflected as positive values in the “net errors 
and omissions” item that, in the methodology followed in this 
paper, are considered as reverse capital flight by residents.
(10.) Savings deposits were insured at 100 percent since the 
1994 crisis. Additionally, a scandalous provision imposed by 
the IMF during the negotiations for the additional standby 
agreement in December 2000 extended the guarantee to 
bankrupt banks’ external debts. Hence, international banks’ 
bad loans to Turkish banks are henceforth guaranteed and to 
be covered by the Turkish exchequer. The “moral hazard” 
dimension of this provision goes without saying, and there is 
no estimate on the magnitude involved.
(11.) During the first eleven months of 2000, exports remained 
practically unchanged but imports rose by 37 percent, more 
than doubling the trade deficit to 25 billion dollars. The 
adverse effects of the 1994 Customs Union treaty with the EU 
on the trade balance were delayed because of the substantial 
devaluation that same year, whose protective effects continued 
to prevail during the following five years of mild appreciation. 
These favorable conditions were reversed in 2000 not only 
because of the faster rate of appreciation of the Turkish lira 
vis‐à‐vis the currency basket but also because of the 
depreciation of the euro vis‐à‐vis the dollar.
(12.) Yet the realized external disequilibria should have come 
as no surprise to the IMF. Past experience of all exchange 
rate–based stabilization programs show that they initially 
generate a demand‐based expansion accompanied by rising 
and usually unsustainable trade and current deficits, followed 
by a contractionary phase—the magnitude of which depends 
on the size of the earlier external deficits. An overview of such 
exchange rate–based disinflation and stabilization is 
summarized in Calvo (2001); Calvo and Vegh (1999); Calvo, 
Reinhart, and Vegh (1995); Amadeo (1996); Agenor (2000); 
Akyuz and Cornforth (1999); Diaz‐Alejandro (1985); Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999); Frenkel (1995); and Agenor and Montiel 
(1999, ch. 8). For individual country experiences, see Corbo 
(1985), on Chile; Patinkin (1993) and Bruno (1993) on Israel; 
and Frenkel and Fanelli (1998) on Argentina. The IMF itself 
had access to a series of interim reports and staff papers 
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documenting such possible effects on the financial market. 
See, for example, Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998).
(13.) There were, without doubt, additional complications. The 
number of banks transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance 
Fund kept increasing throughout 2000. Most of their owners 
faced criminal charges and were arrested. The shock and 
apprehension of the financial community was aggravated 
when the newly established Board of Banking Supervision and 
Regulation called on the banks to reduce the open positions 
between their foreign exchange liabilities and assets to the 
pre‐set limits by the end of the year. This resulted in additional 
foreign exchange demand.
(14.) The weighted average of interest rates on 2000 auctions, 
that is, 36 percent deflated by 20 percent (i.e., the change in 
the nominal exchange rate).
(15.) $8.1 billion in IMF credits between November 2000 and 
June 2001 financed part of the reserve depletion of $15.2 
billion.
(16.) Elements of this vicious cycle are further studied in 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); Adelman and Yeldan (2000); 
Diaz‐Alejandro (1985); and are more recently referred to as 
the Neftci‐Frenkel cycle in Frenkel 1998.
(17.) This interpretation is shared by many researchers. 
Unrecorded current account operations, for example 
smuggling as well as foreign exchange movements in and out 
of the formal sector, without any cross‐border transactions 
taking place are also reflected in the EO item. The latter 
interpretation appears to be more valid for Africa.
(18.) The sixteen countries covered are Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, 
Thailand, and Turkey.
(19.) UNCTAD (1999), 110–11.
(20.) The differential between the rate at which reserves are 
borrowed and the return on the international assets at which 
they are invested represents the net loss on reserve 
accumulation. This resembles the case of a head of household 
in a developing country who borrows from the bank and then 
 Turkey, 1980–2000: Financial Liberalization, Macroeconomic (In)Stability, and 
Patterns of Distribution
Page 101 of 102
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Bilkent 
University Library; date: 13 December 2018
puts the borrowed money in a deposit account at the same 
bank. These two transactions that generate a net loss to the 
household may appear totally absurd and irrational; but in 
fact, have a logic of their own if the deposit account is used to 
“gain respectability” from the consular office of, say, Australia, 
to which he has applied for a visa.
(21.) UNCTAD (1999), 108.
(22.) The only non‐hot capital movement that was affected by 
the 1989 liberalization was, probably, the FDI abroad of 
residents.
(23.) Note that period coverage for recent hot money 
movements in tables 14.7 and 14.7b are different: the former 
(row 9) covers the first three quarters of 2001, whereas the 
latter incorporates the last two months of 2000 additionally.
(24.) See, for example, Boratav, Yeldan, and Köse (2000); 
Onaran (2000); Yeldan and Köse (1999); Filiztekin (1999); 
Ercan (1999); Pamukçu and de Boer (1999); Köse and Yeldan 
(1998); Yentürk (1997, 1999); Uygur (1996); Kepenek (1996); 
Şenses (1996); Bulutay (1995); and Maraşlioǧlu and Tiktik 
(1991).
(25.) See, for instance, Metin, Voyvoda, and Yeldan (2001a); 
Güneş (1996); Kaytaz, Altin, and Güneş (1993); Katircioǧlu 
(1990); and Şahinkaya (1993) for the evaluation of market 
concentration and patterns of oligopolistic markup pricing in 
the industrial commodity markets. Güneş, Köse, and Yeldan 
(1996), in turn, document comprehensive panel data on the 
degree of concentration in Turkish manufacturing using the 
standard Input‐Output classification for the period 1985–1993.
(26.) This is the threshold used by Boratav, Yeldan, and Köse 
(2000) and Yeldan and Köse (1999), where, on a further level 
of finesse, the sectors that had CR4 ratios between 30 and 49 
percent are classified as “monopolistically competitive,” and 
sectors with CR4 ratios exceeding 50 percent are regarded as 
“oligopolistic.”
(27.) All income data are inclusive of taxes and are in gross 
terms.
(28.) See Boratav for a narrative support of this claim.
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(29.) See UNCTAD 1999, table 5.2. Consolidated African data 
for 1980–1998 generate the same signs except for the EO 
item, which tends to be positive (UNCTAD 2000, table 3).
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